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Chrysler Voyager

2002 minivans & 3-row suvs reliability, crash and rollover tests, chrysler vs. other new car brands, owner reports, 2002 minivans 3-row ratings.

In most cases, automotive warranties are based on the vehicle identification number (VIN), and the warranty will be valid regardless of ownership. The dealership can tell you exactly how much warranty is left.

• 4-speed Automatic
• 2.4-liter 4 (150 hp)
• 3.3-liter V6 (180 hp)

The Voyager, and its twin the Dodge Caravan, was redesigned for 2001. Although engine power increased, acceleration remains lackluster and fuel economy unimpressive with the popular 3.3-liter, 180-hp V6. A harsh and unresponsive 2.4-liter, 150-hp four-cylinder, shared with the PT Cruiser, continues as the base engine. Powertrain shortcomings aside, the Voyager rides fairly comfortably, and its handling is secure. The third-row seat is a handy 50/50 split bench that's fairly easy to remove, though not as versatile as some competitors' fold-into-the-floor designs. An entry-level eC model joined the lineup for 2002. Optional power-adjustable pedals were also added.

Chrysler brought back the Voyager in 2020 to split its minivan offering as a lower-cost version of the Pacifica. The Voyager takes over for the L and LX trim levels, which account for about a third of Pacificas sold, thereby offering a more affordable entry into the minivan line. It uses the same 3.6-liter V6 engine as the Pacifica, matched with a nine-speed automatic transmission. That combination delivers good power in the Pacifica, where it returned 21 mpg overall. The Voyager does not offer key advanced safety systems, such as forward collision warning or automatic emergency braking. At least, blind spot warning is optional. 

All Voyagers became Chryslers since the Plymouth brand was phased out. The Chrysler Voyager/Dodge Caravan twins are still competitive. They ride fairly quietly and handle reasonably well. A handy second, left-side sliding door is optional, but power operation isn't offered. The 3.3-liter, 158-hp V6 is the engine to choose. Other engine choices are a 2.4-liter four-cylinder and a 3.0-liter V6. The front seats provide decent support. The middle and rear seats are easy to unhitch for maximum cargo room. They're very heavy, but small wheels make them easier to move.

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Article Contents

Introduction, the assault, the hostages, acknowledgments, conflict of interest statement, data availability, nord-ost: russia’s medical failure in the 2002 crisis.

The views expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the DoD, Department of the Army, Madigan Army Medical Center or the U.S. Government.

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Matthew D Turner, Jason Sapp, Nord-Ost: Russia’s Medical Failure in the 2002 Crisis, Military Medicine , 2023;, usad467, https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usad467

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The 2002 hostage crisis at a Moscow theater transfixed the attention of the world. While the initial assault, led by Spetsnaz commandos, successfully secured the building, the Russian security force’s utter failure at coordinating with medical services led to the preventable deaths of over 100 hostages.

On October 23, 2002, the musical production of Nord-Ost was performing at the Dubrovka Theatre, 1 some 5 km from the Kremlin, the very seat of Russia’s power. At the start of the second act, the theater was suddenly swarmed by armed assailants, 22 men and 19 women, led by a Chechen rebel commander named Movsar Barayev. 1 The attack was meticulously planned and executed—the Chechens had prepared for 2-3 months prior and brought with them 15 rifles, 114 grenades, 11 pistols, and even a homemade grenade launcher. 2 Within minutes, they had secured 979 hostages. 3 As Russian authorities scrambled to respond, the Chechens converted the theater into a veritable fortress. Many donned suicide belts; explosives were affixed to the theater’s columns, 1 key entry points were covered by explosives and snipers, and the explosives were constantly moved whenever hostages were released or visitors came into the building. 2

Over the next several days, Russian authorities surrounded the theater, and conditions soon began to deteriorate. Despite the releasing of some 200 hostages, supplies inside the Dubrovka quickly ran low. The orchestra pit was converted into a mass latrine, further contributing to the miserable conditions. 1 Although the Kremlin insisted that they would soon open official negotiations, President Vladimir Putin never intended to negotiate, at one point telling his cabinet that “I want to stress that Russia will not enter into any agreement with terrorists and will not yield to any blackmail.” 1

Between 05:00 and 05:15 on 26 October, 2 Russian special forces teams began pumping a powerful anesthetic gas into the Dubrovka’s air-conditioning system. The gas was not instantaneous—one hostage was able to call a local radio station some 2 min before being overwhelmed by the fumes, and some of the hostage-takers were described as screaming “Gas! Gas! Turn on the air conditioning!” One British hostage remembered the hostage-takers pointing out the dense clouds of smoke as they slowly descended from the ceiling. 4 By some accounts, a handful of the Chechens were able to don protective respirators, while others on the outskirts of the theater were not affected at all. 2

Approximately 15 min later, three separate Spetsnaz teams stormed the theater, 2 systematically eliminating most of the hostage-takers, conscious or not. 1 By 07:20, the building was deemed secure. 2 In one regard, the authorities were incredibly lucky—the terrorists had a brief window before the gas took effect in which they could have detonated the explosives and killed hundreds. Their failure to do so has been attributed to surprise, 1 a collapse in their hierarchy due to Barayev’s death during the early stages of the assault 2 or a combination of other factors.

While the initial stages of the assault succeeded, the rescue effort almost immediately fell into disorganized chaos. 1 Unsure of their orders, Spetznaz commandos began to simply carry out unconscious hostages at approximately 06:20, laying them out on the sidewalk in front of the theater. 5 Although War Veterans Hospital No. 1 stood just across the street, 2 there was no field hospital set up nearby, no triage teams had been readied, and there had been no organized preparation to distribute the hostages across the city’s healthcare network. 5 This specific failure to coordinate combat and logistical forces can be seen as part of a wider culture of miscommunication and disorganization within Russian counterinsurgency forces during both the First and Second Chechen Wars. 6

There was no evacuation available until 07:20, when the first bus full of drugged captives finally left the theater. The next two buses didn’t leave until 07:50, and hostages were still being retrieved from the theater by 11:00. 5 Even then, there were no medical personnel on board the buses, and the city’s police failed to clear traffic for the victims. The distribution of victims was also lax; some hospitals were completely overwhelmed by the influx of causalities, while others saw little more than a handful. 5

While military medics visited Moscow hospitals several hours before the raid and cryptically advised staff to increase their supplies of naloxone, 7 the authorities refused to release any further information on the gas. Initial responders were not told what chemical had been used and were not given instructions on how to treat affected hostages. 1 In contrast, the Spetnaz commandos appear to have been well prepared—reports after the incident noted that the theater’s floors were littered with empty syringes, presumably used by special forces as an antidote against exposure to the gas. 2 This failure of communication between security forces and medical personnel directly lead to the deaths of at least 125 hostages in the raid. 1 Hundreds more suffered from permanent damage to their vision and hearing. 5 For several days following the raid, authorities placed armed guards at hospitals, ordering that none of the former hostages be released. 4 To this day, the true formula of the gas remains classified. 5

It wasn’t until under 30 October, under mounting international pressure, that the Russian Health Minister declared that the gas used was a derivative of fentanyl, and thus did not violate the Chemical Weapons Convention. 4 The aerosol was likely a mixture of carfentanil and remifentanil, incredibly potent fentanyl derivatives typically used to tranquilize large animals. The Russian military had expressed an interest in these compounds since the early 1990s, 4 and should have taken the extremely lethal potential of these gases 4 into account when planning the attack. General Vladimir Vasil’ev’s assertion after the raid that the hostages needed only “a little fresh air” 5 rings hollow in this regard, particularly when the hostages, weakened by 3 days of imprisonment in miserable conditions, would have been even more susceptible to the gas. 2

In contrast, the November 15, 2015 multisite terrorist attacks in Paris, involving four separate locations and hundreds of hostages, show the lifesaving potential when civilian emergency medical services are properly coordinated with military personnel. Despite significantly less warning time than in the case of Nord-Ost, French personnel enacted the White Plan, a 20-year contingency for mass casualty scenarios. While the scale was similar to that of Nord-Ost, with 129 dead and over 300 injured, effective evacuation, triage, and treatment allowed the French response to save hundreds of lives. Even during the pivotal moments of the night, when government forces launched an assault on hostage-takers in the Bataclan concert hall, medical personnel were in active and transparent communication with both the government and the public, minimizing panic while maximizing the number of lives saved. 8 The exceptionally low hospital mortality rate can be directly attributed to the successful coordination between various emergency units that night. 9

The Nord-Ost assault was hailed as a success by the Russian government. 10 Reportedly, Russian forces were willing to accept a maximum loss of 150 hostages. 2 Against such a well-prepared and entrenched enemy, collateral damage is likely inevitable. However, the utter failure of the security forces to coordinate even rudimentary evacuation and treatment with medical services led to scores of deaths that might have been prevented with even the most basic preparation. 1

The authors have no acknowledgements.

INDIVIDUAL AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION

CPT M.D.T. compiled the research and wrote the first draft of the original manuscript. COL J.S. reviewed the manuscript, providing editing and advice. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

INSTITUTIONAL CLEARANCE

Not applicable.

CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRATION

Institutional review board (human subjects), institutional animal care and use committee (iacuc).

None declared.

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. All data are freely available.

Short   P : Putin . Henry Holt and Company , 2022 .

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Pilch   R , Dolnik   A : The Moscow theater hostage crisis: the perpetrators, their tactics, and the Russian response . Int Negot   2003 ; 8 ( 3 ): 577 – 611 .doi: 10.1163/1571806031310798

Snetkov   A : The image of the terrorist threat in the official Russian press: the Moscow theatre crisis (2002) and the Beslan hostage crisis (2004) . Eur Asia Stud   2007 ; 59 ( 8 ): 1349 – 65 .doi: 10.1080/09668130701655192

Riches   JR , Read   RW , Black   RM , Cooper   NJ , Timperley   CM : Analysis of clothing and urine from Moscow theatre siege casualties reveals carfentanil and remifentanil use . J Anal Toxicol   2012 ; 36 ( 9 ): 647 – 56 .doi: 10.1093/jat/bks078

Holiman   A : The case of Nord-Ost: Dubrovka and the search for answers . Eur Asia Stud   2009 ; 61 ( 2 ): 283 – 311 .doi: 10.1080/09668130802630862

Kramer   M : Guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency and terrorism in the North Caucasus: the military dimension of the Russian–Chechen conflict . Eur Asia Stud   2005 ; 57 ( 2 ): 209 – 90 .doi: 10.1080/09668130500051833

Wax   PM , Becker   CE , Curry   SC : Unexpected “gas” casualties in Moscow: a medical toxicology perspective . Ann Emergency Med   2003 ; 41 ( 5 ): 700 – 5 .doi: 10.1067/mem.2003.148

Hirsch   M , Carli   P , Nizard   R , et al. : The medical response to multisite terrorist attacks in Paris . Lancet   2015 ; 386 ( 10012 ): 2535 – 8 .doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(15)01063-6

Carli   P , Pons   F , Levraut   J , et al. : The French emergency medical services after the Paris and Nice terrorist attacks: what have we learnt?   Lancet   2017 ; 390 ( 10113 ): 2735 – 8 .doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31590-8

Tin   D , Kallenborn   Z , Hart   A , Hertelendy   AJ , Ciottone   GR : Opioid attack and the implications for counter-terrorism medicine . Prehosp Disaster Med   2021 ; 36 ( 6 ): 661 – 3 .doi: 10.1017/S1049023X21001059

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