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Trade agreements and international technology transfer

• Original Paper
• Open access
• Published: 01 June 2021
• Volume 157 , pages 631–665, ( 2021 )

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• Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-3247-8557 1 , 2 &
• Santiago Chelala 3  

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A Correction to this article was published on 30 June 2021

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This is the first paper that analyzes for a global sample of countries how trade agreements that include technology-related provisions impact exports of goods, and how this impact differs depending on the technology content of the goods. It includes estimations of a structural gravity model for a panel of 176 countries over the period 1995–2015. The model differentiates between provisions relating technology transfer, technical cooperation, research and development, and patents and intellectual property rights. It also estimates the differences in these effects depending on whether the trade flow in question is between countries with similar or different levels of development. The main results indicate that regional trade agreements (RTAs) that contain technology provisions generate a significantly higher volume of trade than RTAs that do not, after controlling for the depth of the RTAs. For countries that ratify RTAs that include such provisions, it is exports of technology-intensive goods that increase the most. Trade agreements including such provisions have a heterogeneous effect that varies by income level of the trading partners and depends on the extent to which the RTA incorporates other provisions.

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1 Introduction

Since the 1990s, the defining feature of international economic relations has been the proliferation of trade agreements, which have filled what Bhagwati ( 1995 ) described as the “spaghetti bowl” to the brim. These agreements have become more complex over time and have gone from focusing solely on tariff reductions—shallow agreements—to having a much wider scope—deep agreements—in which technology transfer provisions have gone from being the exception to the rule. These provisions, which are among the most controversial elements of regional trade agreements (RTAs) Footnote 1 are more far-reaching than the minimum standards of protection provided by the multilateral agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). They mainly seek to facilitate technology transfer and provide a common regulatory framework to inventors in the areas covered by the agreement. Moreover, strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) is sometimes established as a prerequisite for developing countries to participate in RTAs with more advanced economies, in order to avoid opposition from interest groups in the latter. For instance, although the European Union (EU) successfully concluded RTAs with Japan and Singapore in 2019 and with Vietnam in 2020, negotiations with India, which started in 2007, were brought to a de facto standstill in 2013. Some critical issues in the negotiation are generic medicine production in India, the existence of technological transfer restrictions and the EU interest in patent protection.

Although these provisions are generally expected to facilitate technology transfer and benefit economic development, the theoretical predictions are mixed. On the one hand, the inclusion of technology provisions in RTAs—especially relating to IPR—should prevent imitative competition in the integrated area and lead to an increase in exports with high technology content (Lai et al., 2020 ; Maskus, 2016 ). Moreover, preventing imitation in the South will reduce the production of imitative products, providing an additional boost to Northern exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995 ). Stricter enforcement of IPR could also bring about a shift away from imitation towards licensing (market-based technology acquisition), in turn leading to productivity gains and increased exports (Ivus, 2010 ; Lai et al., 2020 ). However, Maskus and Penubarti ( 1995 ) discuss a potential market-power effect from stricter IPR, which implies restricted sales and higher prices in the destination markets and hence reduces trade. In the medium term though, stronger protections could also foster innovation in less advanced economies. Finally, more recent models that account for heterogeneous firms find that stronger IPR lower the productivity cut-off of exporting and licensing and hence increase exports (Lai et al., 2020 ).

Given the abovementioned theoretical predictions, the extent to which the type of innovation and technology transfer provisions included in the RTA could affect trade flows remains an empirical question. The related empirical literature has mostly focused on the trade effects of IPR-related provisions in RTAs (Campi & Dueñas, Footnote 2 2019 ; Chelala and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2017 ;  Dhingra et al., 2018 ; Maskus and Ridley, 2019 ), disregarding the fact that the provisions also include technology transfer cooperation, technical assistance and joint R&D projects. Moreover, these papers cover a limited number of RTAs.

We seek to extend the existing empirical literature in three directions. First, we evaluate the extent to which different technology clauses in RTAs affect trade flows for a global sample of countries. Second, we investigate the kind of goods these clauses affect the most, distinguishing between goods classified according to their technological content. Finally, we examine whether the effects vary by type of clause and income per capita of the signatory countries. Footnote 3 According to the theory, we expect the effect to be heterogeneous across goods, to be stronger for goods that are technology intensive, and to depend on the level of development of the trading countries. To achieve these aims, we compiled a database of RTAs with technology transfer and innovation-related provisions, drawing on a detailed analysis of the fine print of trade agreements that have entered into force in the last decades. We classified provisions into four subgroups: (1) General intention to transfer technology, e.g. the RTA between the EU and the Caribbean Community (EU-CARIFORUM) establishes the intensification of activities to promote innovation and technology transfer between the parties; (2) Technical cooperation, e.g. the Japan-Indonesia RTA establishes explicit technical cooperation in the telecommunications sector; (3) Intellectual property, e.g. the South Korea-United States agreement includes the protection of IPR; and (4) Joint work on R&D, e.g. the Chile-Australia RTA regulates trade in R&D and innovation. The provisions mostly refer to all goods, but also contain specific references to given categories such as pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. Footnote 4 Using these data in combination with bilateral trade flows and a number of control variables, the effect of these provisions on trade are evaluated distinguishing between RTAs with and without technology provisions and controlling for the depth of the RTA. Methodologically, we estimated a gravity model using bilateral exports among 176 countries over the period from 1995 to 2015 to examine whether RTAs impact trade differently depending on which technology-related provisions they include. Our estimations distinguished between the four possible types of clauses. Footnote 5

The main novelties of our study are threefold. First, we extend the types of provisions analyzed to include technical cooperation, innovation, and technology transfer, in addition to IPR. The second novelty is a methodological improvement, since we estimate a structural gravity model with multilateral resistance terms using the latest techniques put forward in the international trade literature (Head & Mayer, 2014 ; Yotov et al., 2016 ; Zylkin, 2017 ). Finally, we are able to isolate the effect of the technology-type provisions by controlling for the depth of the RTAs, the participation of the signatory countries in the TRIPs agreement, Footnote 6 and membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and currency unions. If any of these factors were excluded from the model, it could generate biases in the estimation of the main effect.

Our main results show that RTAs that include technology transfer provisions generate a significantly higher volume of trade, which in some cases goes beyond the increase generated by RTAs without these provisions. If we break the results down by sector, for countries that ratify RTAs with technology provisions rather than ones without, it is the exports of technology-intensive goods that increase the most. Broken down by levels of economic development, the effects are found to be heterogeneous and also depend on the number of provisions included in the RTA. Footnote 7

This article is organized as follows. Section  2 reviews the literature on trade, trade agreements and technology transfer. The different types of technology provisions in RTAs and some stylized facts are described in Sect.  3 . The specification of the gravity model and estimation methodology are detailed in Sect.  4 . Section  5 outlines the results by type of good, type of technology transfer clause, and by the level of development of the trade partners and presents a number of robustness checks, including replications of some results obtained by Campi and Dueñas ( 2019 ) and Dhingra et al. ( 2018 ). Finally, Sect.  6 outlines our conclusions.

2 Trade, trade agreements and technology transfer

Trade agreements can generate technological spillovers indirectly, through an increase in trade flows, and directly, by including technology related provisions. Footnote 8 Although this paper mainly focuses on the second channel, for completeness we briefly discuss the indirect channel.

An excellent summary of the literature on indirect spillovers can be found in Hoppe ( 2005 ), who identifies three main factors that determine technology transfer: direct efforts to make the transfer successful, the capacity to adopt new technologies, and the differences between the trading countries. The author concludes that trade enables technology transfer mainly through imports of capital goods and openness to export markets, which enable learning-by-doing, thus increasing total factor productivity (TFP). Along the same lines, Keller ( 2004 ) shows evidence indicating that imports are a significant channel for technology diffusion. For instance, bilateral relations may provide information on technologies developed abroad, when the importer receives and analyzes the good. Alternatively, migration flows could also provide such information. People with different technological backgrounds may travel to the destination country carrying their different knowledge, which they transfer to the local population in the importing country. Footnote 9 Similarly, Madsen ( 2007 ) draws on 135 years of data on TFP and imports with high-technology content for OECD countries and finds a robust relationship between TFP and knowledge imports. Specifically, technological knowledge spillovers contributed to TFP-related convergence among OECD countries between 1870 and 2004. These indirect spillover effects may arise with or without RTAs. For instance, they can be a consequence of unilateral trade liberalization policies. Conversely, direct transfers of technology require explicit commitments. RTAs can be used as a tool to increase technology transfer not just through trade itself but also through specific provisions that regulate this transfer and cover aspects related to technical cooperation. Ivus ( 2010 ) points to the existence of a virtuous circle by showing that better consolidated property rights have positive effects on trade. In particular, the author finds that the increase in IPR in response to the TRIPs agreement fostered patent-sensitive exports from developed to developing countries.

Since most RTAs with technology provisions specifically state that members have to comply with TRIPs, it is important to refer here to the main purpose of this agreement. TRIPs is a minimum standards multilateral agreement concerning intellectual property that provides protection for nearly all forms of IPR in WTO member countries. Those countries are free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the agreement in accordance with their own legal system. TRIPs also includes enforcement, remedies and dispute resolution procedures. Although the idea is that all WTO members will have to comply with TRIPs, specific transition periods were originally established giving developing countries more time—initially until 2005—to adapt their legal system to certain obligations and to comply with them. The waiver was extended up to 2013 for the least developed countries and until 2016 for certain obligations, mostly concerning pharmaceutical products. Detailed information can be found on the WTO website.

Several authors have investigated the effect of TRIPs on trade and found a significant increase in imports of high-technology products after ratifying the agreement (Ivus, 2010 ; Delgado et al., 2013 ; Maskus and Yang, 2018 ). The main difference between TRIPs and the technology provisions included in the RTAs is that the latter are a means to reinforce the compliance mechanisms and concretize the technical cooperation procedures already established in TRIPs; they also serve as a bridge to ensure enforcement of the national regulations.

Intellectual property has been analyzed by Campi and Dueñas ( 2019 ), who explore how RTAs with IPR chapters affected trade for a panel of 110 countries over 19 years. The authors distinguish between products that are highly intellectual property-intensive and those that are not, finding that the results are similar for both types of goods. Surprisingly, the authors find that trade flows between developed countries benefit most, but do not observe substantial gains for developing countries. However, they estimate a gravity model that does not incorporate the so-called time-variant multilateral resistance terms and excludes zero trade flows from the analysis. Generally speaking, these two factors generate biases in the RTA effects (Head & Mayer, 2014 ).

Maskus and Ridley ( 2019 ) also focus on IPR-related RTAs and their effect on the composition on trade. The authors adopt an impact evaluation approach defining treatment RTAs as those in which one partner is the US, the EU or the EFTA. They find that although the effect on total trade is limited, there is a sizable effect on IPR-sensitive sectors.

Finally, Dhingra et al. ( 2018 ) examine the contribution of deep non-tariff provisions on international trade in goods and services. When considering IPR provisions separately, they do not find that RTAs with these provisions boost gross bilateral trade in goods. This could be due to the fact that many of the trade agreements in force are not covered by their limited sample of 43 countries.

We contribute to the cited literature by using a global sample of countries, applying an enhanced econometric methodology and considering a finer classification of technology-related provisions than in previous studies.

3 Trade agreements containing technology provisions

To carry out this study, we created a database that drew on a detailed analysis of the fine print of trade agreements. The process started by screening information from the legal text of 302 bilateral or multilateral trade agreements filed with the WTO, the World Bank, or the Organization of American States (OAS). From these agreements we selected those coded as free trade agreements (FTAs), economic integration agreements (EIAs), FTAs & EIAs and Custom Unions (CUs), thus excluding Partial Scope Agreements (PSAs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). Footnote 10 The remaining agreements in our dataset total 231, of which 205 were signed between 1995 and 2015, which is the period covered in our empirical analysis. We categorized agreements depending on whether they contained provisions on general intention to transfer technology; technical cooperation; R&D and innovation; and patents and intellectual property. Footnote 11

More specifically, the first category “general intention to transfer technology” refers to RTAs that include innovation policies, participation in framework programs on innovation, the promotion of technology transfer and dissemination of new technologies. The second category “technical cooperation” lists shared research projects, exchange of researchers, and development of public–private partnerships as objectives of the RTAs. In the third group “R&D and innovation” the text of the RTAs refers to collaboration in research and development projects and innovation. Finally, the fourth group “patents and intellectual property rights” contain RTAs with provisions that refer to patenting activities and intellectual property in the corresponding regulatory framework, obligations and enforcement mechanisms. We believe that the categories allow us to better distinguish between general intentions, specific forms of cooperation, commitments and obligations, which is important for the empirical analysis.

The technology-related provisions included in deep RTAs mostly refer to all goods, but also contain specific references to certain sectors. For example, Chapter 2 of the RTA between the EU and CARICOM is dedicated to Innovation and IPR. Section  1 contains six articles, of which two refer to specific sectors, namely, information and telecommunication technologies and renewable energy. In Sect.  2 , most articles refer to all sectors, with special references to plant varieties and animals. It contains four subsections dedicated to listing the main principals, defining standards and covering enforcement and cooperation matters. According to subsection 1, the signatory countries have a transition period in which to enact the corresponding national laws required to comply with the given obligations; this period is 6 years in general and 12 years for least developed countries. Moreover, special references to compliance with international agreements, such as TRIPs and WIPO, are included. The wording used is “ signatory countries shall comply with… ”. Subsection 4 gives a very detailed description of the procedures concerning infringement of the obligations, remedies and corrective measures to be applied. A second example is the agreement between the US and South Korea, which dedicates 12 articles in Chapter 18 to IPR. Article 18.11 states the obligation to ratify and comply with the 10 international agreements listed. These include conventions, such as Paris and Berne, and treaties, such as Budapest and Singapore. Only one article (18.9) refers to “ certain regulated products ”, specifically to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products.

The sum of the four categories is greater than the number of agreements because there are agreements that include more than one of the types of technology provision considered here. All the same, our analysis reveals that from1995 to 2015 most agreements contain at least one type of technology provision. In particular, 152 RTAs contain at a minimum one type, whereas 31 include all four types analyzed and 53 have none.

Among the agreements that include all four areas, the main proponents are the EU (with Caribbean, North African and Eastern European countries, Central America, Chile, Israel and South Africa) and EFTA (with Colombia and Peru), Costa Rica (with China and Singapore), the United States (with Panama and Peru) and Chile (with Turkey), some of which are geographically close to the other party (for example the US-Panama agreement) and some of which are not (Costa Rica-Singapore).

Among the agreements that do not include any of these clause types, many are between developing countries, with fewer between developed and developing countries (5 promoted by the EU, 7 by EFTA, 2 by the US).

The distribution of exports depending on the type of provision included is shown in Fig.  1 . The graph indicates that the density curve for export flows within RTAs with provisions in patents and IPR is located to the far right of the graph. Slightly to the left is the plot for those with provisions tackling technology cooperation, as well as the one for RTAs with technology transfer provisions, and a bit more to the left the plot for RTAs with R&D cooperation clauses. In comparison, trade within RTAs with no provisions referring to any technology topic shows a distribution denser towards the left side of the graph and with a significantly lower density at the average.

Source : Compiled by the authors based on bilateral and multilateral trade agreements

Distribution of aggregated exports by type of provision.

In order to compare the distribution of trade within and outside RTAs, Fig.  2 shows a comparison of density estimates for export flows between pair of countries with no RTAs and those with RTAs with and without technology provisions. The density curves reveal that the distribution of exports is further to the right and with a higher concentration of points around the average for countries with RTAs with such provisions, whereas it is more disperse and shows a lower average for trade within RTAs without tech-provisions. In comparison, the distribution of exports outside RTAs is located more to the left of the picture. Similar outcomes are obtained when Kernel density estimates are shown for high-, medium- and low-technology-content export flows (see Figs.  3 , 4 , 5 in the Appendix).

Source : Compiled by the authors based on RTAs and exports (UNCTAD). Lexp is ln of total exports. Years 1995 to 2017

Distribution of aggregated exports by type of agreement.

Given that Figs.  1 and 2 show unconditional differences in exports, we move in the next section to present the empirical strategy that will allow us to identify causal effects.

4 Empirical strategy

In this section we first outline the main hypotheses and then present the model specification ( 4.1 ) and data description ( 4.2 ). The stylized facts described in Sects.  2 and 3 indicate that the technology provisions found in the RTAs mostly refer to all goods traded, but also contain specific references to certain categories. This is particularly so for the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors, renewable energies and plant varieties and animals. Therefore, we start with an analysis at aggregate level and proceed with a separate analysis for specific sectors. We distinguish between high-, medium- and low-technology-content goods.

The main hypotheses are: (1) Shallow RTAs have a positive effect on trade in goods due to the elimination of tariffs among the member countries, Footnote 12 whereas deep agreements have a greater trade effect. (2) With the inclusion of technology-related provisions, which stimulate technology transfer and protect innovations, a direct technology-related effect on trade is generated, in addition to the expected positive effect postulated in (1). (3) The direct and indirect effects could vary depending on the type of goods traded and the level of development of the trading partners. (4) The effects could vary by provision.

4.1 Specifications for the gravity model

The gravity model has been widely used to predict bilateral trade flows between countries as it is nowadays considered to be a structural model with solid theoretical underpinnings (Allen et al., 2014 ; Anderson, 1979 ; Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2003 ; Bergstrand, 1985 ; Eaton & Kortum, 2002 ; Feenstra, 2016 ). It is particularly appropriate for estimating the effects of trade policies and the importance of the costs of trade that are associated with distance and trade facilitation factors.

Our estimations will capture the effects on bilateral trade of RTAs without and with technology provisions. When an RTA does not contain such provisions, the effect on trade will be solely due to the elimination of trade barriers. RTAs with provisions will have an extra “direct” effect on trade due to the increasing collaboration in R&D and the protection of IPR, particularly in technology-intensive sectors. The econometric model captures the differences between RTAs with and without technology provisions controlling for the number of other provisions that are not trade-related. In other words, we compare agreements of similar depth and in this way the try to mimic the counterfactual, that is, similar RTAs without those provisions.

Two of the model’s most widely appreciated properties are its structural flexibility, which can accommodate the different factors that affect trade, and its predictive power for aggregate trade flows. In its simplest form, when applied to trade, the gravity model predicts that the bilateral exports between two countries are directly proportional to the product of their economic “mass” and inversely proportional to the costs of trade (distance) between them.

According to the underlying theory that has been reformulated and extended by Anderson and van Wincoop ( 2003 ), the model assumes constant elasticity of substitution and product differentiation by place of origin. In addition, prices differ among locations due to symmetric bilateral trade costs. The reduced form of the model is specified as

where X ijt is bilateral exports from country i to country j in year t , and Y it , Y jt and Y t W are the gross domestic products in, respectively the exporting country, the importing country and the world in year t. t ijt denotes trade costs between the exporter and the importer in year t and P it and P jt are the so-called multilateral resistance terms (MRT). Footnote 13 σ is the elasticity of substitution between all goods.

The log-linearized specification of the gravity model is as follows:

where t represents annual periods; X ijt are the exports from country i to country j in period t in current US dollars. Y it ( Y jt ) indicates the exporter’s (importer’s) GDP, all of which are expressed in natural logarithms (ln) and the constant \({(\delta }_{t})\) represents world income that varies over time. The trade cost between the trading partners is usually proxied with time-invariant and time-variant factors that facilitate or hamper trade. Among the former are the geographic distance between countries i and j and other bilateral dummy variables that take the value of 1 if countries i and j share a language, have a shared border, or have colonial ties. Footnote 14 Among the latter are: being a member of a trade agreement (RTA), currency union (CU), the WTO or having ratified TRIPs. Finally, ε ijt is the error term and is assumed to be identically and independently distributed.

Estimating the coefficient for the RTA variable will allow us to evaluate the change in bilateral exports using information from before and after the entry into force of each agreement, indicating whether or not exports between each pair of RTA member countries have increased significantly as a consequence of access to the integration area. In the following estimations, we also distinguish between RTAs depending on whether they include any of the four types of technology transfer clause described above.

In line with the recent gravity literature, the MRT are modeled as time-varying country-specific dummies, as specified in Eq. ( 3 ) below. And to overcome the potential endogeneity of the RTA variable we follow Baier and Bergstrand ( 2007 ) and introduce bilateral time-invariant dummy variables to account for all unobserved heterogeneity that is attached to each country pair relationship.

where the RTA variable denotes both countries (country pair ij ) being members of trade agreements in period t , and k indicates whether the agreement contains provisions on innovation and technology transfer (RTA_tech, k = 1) or does not (RTA_notech, k = 2). We also consider the depth of the agreement (RTA_depth, k = 3). RTA_depth indicates the depth of the agreement, where depth is defined on the basis of the number of provisions covered and is taken from Dür et al. ( 2014 ). Footnote 15 TP ijt represents other time-variant trade cost variables, as described below Eq. ( 2 ), namely, CU, WTO and TRIPs. The fixed (bilateral) effects associated with trade, δ ij , represent the time-invariant characteristics of the trade relationship between i and j and are included to avoid biases due to unobservable factors that affect trade. Given that the influence of variables that are bilateral and time-invariant —such as geographical distance, a common language, or a shared border— is absorbed by fixed bilateral effects, the estimated coefficients for these factors are not directly obtained in this specification of the model.

Exporter-time τ it and importer-time φ jt fixed effects represent all the factors that are specific to each country and time period and affect trade flows. These are included to control for inward and outward multilateral resistance, that is, third countries’ barriers to trade that affect the costs of trade, mainly to account for factors such as relative prices, institutions, infrastructure, or legal factors that vary by country and over time, including the exporter’s/importer’s GDP. Consequently, the inclusion of MRT in the form of dummy variables for each exporter-time and importer-time pair absorbs the effects of the income of the trading countries. The inclusion of these three sets of fixed effects (bilateral, exporter-period, and importer-period) has been recommended in the literature as a suitable way of identifying the effects of RTAs on trade (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007 ; Yotov et al., 2016 ).

Even though it is common practice to estimate the gravity model in its log-linear form, there are many advantages to estimating the model in its multiplicative form using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML), as originally suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro ( 2006 ). Footnote 16 First, the log-transformation of the dependent variable leads to the loss of the zero trade flows and when the zeros are not arbitrarily missing data or random rounding errors, they could carry important information. These zeros could be due to high trade barriers or regular rounding errors associated with small trade flows; as such, dropping these observations will produce inconsistent estimates. Footnote 17 While there are a number of ways to overcome the problem of zero trade flows, Footnote 18 PPML is preferred here as it is straightforward in its application and avoids the theoretically inconsistent method of replacing zero trade flows with an arbitrary value. A second argument in favor of this approach is that, according to Santos Silva and Tenreyro ( 2006 ), estimating the gravity model in its log-linear form rather than in levels can lead to misleading conclusions in the presence of heteroskedasticity as the log transformation affects the disturbances. The PPML estimator resolves this issue, as it is valid under general forms of heteroskedasticity.

The rapid ongoing development of new techniques for estimating the model based on theoretical developments has given rise to a series of practical recommendations documented in Head and Mayer ( 2014 ) and more recently in Yotov et al. ( 2016 ). The authors also suggest proxying MRT and bilateral unobserved heterogeneity using the three abovementioned sets of fixed effects. In line with these developments, the specification for the structural gravity model is as follows:

where the variables are as described below Eqs. ( 2 ) and ( 3 ).

4.2 Data sources and variables

The data on total exports and exports disaggregated by technology intensity came from UNCTAD (unctadstat.org). The classification used here is based on Lall ( 2000 ) and divides products into three groups depending on their level of technology content: high (HT), medium (MT), and low (LT). The HT group contains products that use advanced technologies and change rapidly, which thus require significant investment in R&D and a focus on product design. Some examples are aircraft and telecommunication equipment, pharmaceutical products and medicaments (see Table 7 in the Appendix). The MT group includes capital goods and intermediate products that use skill-intensive technologies and form the basis for industrial activity in mature economies. They tend to include complex technologies with relatively high levels of R&D, require advanced skills, and extended periods of learning. Goods in the engineering and automotive subgroups require considerable interaction between firms to achieve technical efficiency. Finally, the LT group contains stable technologies that are already widespread. These technologies are used in capital equipment at the lower end of the range and are based on relatively simple skills. Many traded products in this group are homogenous and compete on price, and include textiles, garments and footwear. The labor costs of these tend to play a significant part in their competitiveness. As economies of scale and barriers to entry for these products are generally low, the end market tends to grow slowly, with income elasticities below one.

With regard to the data sources for the explanatory variables used in this paper, the data for GDP were obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2019 ), while data on distance, shared border, common language, colonial ties, geographic area, and access to the sea came from CEPII. The construction of RTA variables by type was explained in Sect.  3 .

Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in the model and the corresponding descriptive statistics: means, standard deviations, maximums, and minimums. The list of countries included can be found in the Appendix (Table 6 ).

5 Main results

Table 2 shows the results of Eq. ( 4 ) estimated with the dependent variable in levels using PPML, which is based on the theoretically justified gravity model and includes MRT. The results of the corresponding log–log specification in Eq. ( 3 ) are presented in the Appendix (Table 8 ), where the results of the linearized traditional specification of the gravity model are also shown for comparative purposes. Footnote 19

Table 2 presents the results for total exports in column 1. When using the PPML method, Footnote 20 the estimated effects are generally larger than those obtained with the log–log model. Footnote 21 The results for the variables of interest (RTA_tech and RTA_notech) suggest that while RTAs containing provisions of this type increase total exports by 24% Footnote 22 for shallow agreements (RTA_depth = 0), RTAs without such provisions also show a significant effect on total exports, of slightly higher magnitude. Footnote 23 We also estimated the model with PPML eliminating zero trade flows, keeping the same number of observations as in the log–log model, and the results show that the effects of RTA_tech are smaller in magnitude (the RTA_tech coefficient is 0.081 instead of 0.215 for total exports). Footnote 24

When the model is estimated for exports with different levels of technology content—HT, MT, and LT, according to the abovementioned UNCTAD classification—the results vary. For exports with HT content (in column 2, Table 2 ), agreements containing only technology provisions have a significant effect in terms of stimulating export growth, whereas agreements without such provisions are less effective. More specifically, the point coefficient for RTA_tech indicates that adding technology provisions to an RTA increases trade in HT products by 21% (column 2, first row) independently of whether or not the RTA contains any other type of provisions. Indeed, RTA_depth is not statistically significant for HT products (column 2), and the same is the case for RTA_notech. This means that the partial effect on trade of adding technology provisions is around 15%, [(exp{0.189 − 0.0526} − 1) * 100], which we interpret as the direct effect, whereas the trade effect of eliminating trade policy barriers is around 6%.

The results for exports with MT content are shown in column3 of Table 2 . The effect of RTA_tech is positive and small for shallow RTAs, when RTA_depth = 0, and lower in magnitude than the effect of RTA_notech, but for RTAs with more than 1 provision type (RTA_depth = 2–7) the effect is significant and sizable. For those with LT content, the effect of RTA_tech is statistically significant even for shallow agreements and adds a 5% increase to the effect of RTA_notech (see column 4 in Table 2 ). The results also show that the coefficient of RTA_depth is positive and significant for MT and LT groups, indicating that deeper RTAs promote exports with MT content the most. In this estimation, TRIPs and WTO present collinearity problems and cannot be estimated in the same model. We show the results including TRIPs since it is more relevant in this setting. The estimated coefficient for TRIPs indicates that total exports and exports with LT content are positively affected, whereas the effect is not statistically significant for exports with MT and HT content. Finally, countries in a currency union trade substantially more than others, with the effect being slightly higher for total exports and exports with MT content.

Since the effects estimated might be heterogeneous, and since the types of technology clause vary depending on whether the agreement is between developed countries and developing countries or between countries with similar income levels, we now proceed to evaluate the effect on trade by groups of countries and for each type of clause separately. The resulting information will enable us to identify the heterogeneity of the effects.

5.1 Heterogeneous effects for different groups of countries and technology provisions

In this section, we present our estimation of the gravity model after first identifying whether the trade flow is between developed countries (North: N) or developing ones (South: S), looking at the four possible origin/destination combinations (NS; NN; SN; and SS). Footnote 25 Specification (4) is augmented with interactions between RTA_tech and the direction of trade flows. The results are presented in Table 3 . The first rows show the coefficients obtained for the interaction terms. It can be observed in the first row that shallow RTAs (RTA_depth = 0) with technology provisions between developed countries (NN) have a positive and significant effect on trade in high technology goods, but not on MT and LT goods. For trade between developing countries (SS) there is also an extra trade effect above the one obtained for RTA_notech, in this case for all types of goods. However, for agreements between developed and developing countries, the direct effect on trade of having technology-related provisions is negative for shallow RTAs, indicating that only when the depth of the agreements is considerable (RTA_depth >  = 4) can any indirect trade effect be magnified. The marginal effects of adding technology provisions for different levels of RTA depth are shown in Table 4 .

The results shown in Table 3 also suggests that RTAs with technology provisions benefit exports between developing countries (SS) proportionately more, as indicated by the coefficient of RTA_tech_SS. They also benefit exports of goods with LT content relatively more, although they do still benefit HT and MT exports when the agreement includes technology provisions and exports go from one developing country to another.

Table 4 shows that the incremental effect on exports of adding technology-related provisions is substantial for SS trade flows and increase with the depth of the RTAs (number of additional provisions on other subjects). For NN trade, the marginal effects are also positive for all types of goods when the depth of the RTA is at least 4, whereas for NS and SN negative marginal effects are shown for less inclusive RTAs (RTA_depth < 4). This means that the short-run effects on trade of including technology-related provisions could lead to lower exports if the RTAs do not also regulate product, labor and environmental standards, for example. Finally, for RTAs of maximum depth, most marginal effects are shown to be positive, and it is only for exports from developed to developing countries (NS) that some small negative effects are found.

Next, we differentiate between each of the four possible technology clause types. The gravity model is estimated with each provision relating to technology and innovation included separately in a single model for total exports and exports of HT, MT and LT goods. The aim is to ascertain whether the different types of provisions have a different direct effect on exports. The results, shown in Table 5 , indicate that we cannot accept that the RTA with provisions affects exports equally for each type of provision. In particular, for total exports (column 1) RTAs with provisions on intellectual property rights and patents increase exports significantly more than RTAs without such provisions, whereas those with technology transfer, technical cooperation or R&D provisions show a negative coefficient, indicating that for shallow agreements the addition of those provisions does not magnify the trade effect of basic RTAs; on the contrary, they reduce it. For HT goods, both intellectual property rights and technical cooperation seem to exert a positive effect on exports, which is not present for RTAs without technology provisions (RTA_notech is not statistically significant in column 2). However, adding technology transfer provisions seems to decrease HT exports, perhaps due to the fact that it will facilitate importers’ specialization in the production and exports of these goods. Concerning MT and LT exports, it also seems in this case that the most influential provisions are those concerning patents and intellectual property; and once again, the additional trade effect is positive and slightly higher than for HT goods. However, adding provisions in the other three categories considered does seem to reduce exports.

5.2 Robustness checks

As alternatives to the estimations presented here, the model was estimated for time intervals as suggested in Yotov et al. ( 2016 ) and the results for the target variables were practically unchanged. Table 10 shows the results using data for every three years.

Second, as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand ( 2007 ) to test for the potential endogeneity of the trade policy variable, we have estimated the model including 4 leads of the RTA variables. The results were used to test for the joint significance of the 4 leads of the RTA variables. Footnote 26 The fact that the sum of the t + 1 to t + 4 coefficients is not statistically significant indicates that we are effectively controlling for endogeneity using bilateral time-invariant fixed effects. Moreover, we adopt the strategy proposed by the same authors of incorporating the RTA variable with a number of different lags to consider the effects of phasing in trade agreements; the estimated coefficients indicate that the effects materialized between 4 and 8 years after the entry into force of the RTA, depending on the type of goods traded.

Third, we have replicated the results in Campi and Dueñas ( 2019 ) using the gravity model with the dependent variable in logarithms and with pair fixed effects, but without MRT. The results, reported in Table 11 , show that the RTA coefficient is very similar to the one obtained by those authors, whereas the coefficients for the RTA with and without intellectual property provisions differ. We obtained a positive and significant effect for the RTA with intellectual property provisions and a not statistically significant coefficient for RTA without, whereas they reported a stronger and positive effect for RTA without intellectual property provisions. This could be due to the fact that the number of observations in our estimations is almost double that used by Campi and Dueñas ( 2019 ), despite the fact that we restricted the sample of countries to match their sample. More research is needed to find the cause of the divergence in the results.

Finally, we have replicated the results in Dhingra et al. ( 2018 ) for gross exports of goods using high dimensional fixed effects with 2-year (as in their baseline model) and 4-year time intervals. The results are shown in Table 12 . Columns 1 and 2 are comparable to those in columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 (Dhingra et al., 2018 , page 25). Columns 4 to 8 replicate their Table 12 (Dhingra et al., 2018 , page 38). We confirm that for their sample of 43 countries the coefficient on intellectual property provisions is not statistically significant, whereas in the extended sample a positive and significant effect is found for it, as it is the case in our estimations.

6 Conclusions

Including innovation provisions for direct technology transfer in RTAs has different effects on exports depending on the direction of trade, the level of development of the countries of origin and destination, and the type of clause included in the agreement. The main results of this study indicate that RTAs that contain technology-related provisions generate a significantly higher aggregate volume of trade than RTAs that do not, after controlling for the depth of the agreements. When all countries are considered, for those that ratify RTAs with such provisions rather than those without, it is exports of technology-intensive goods that increase the most.

Patterns found in the results indicate which countries or sectors should benefit from the inclusion of technology provisions. SS agreements have positive effects on exports of HT, MT and LT, which are higher in magnitude for LT exports; this finding reflects their relatively low level of technological development. In NN agreements, the effects of RTAs are less pronounced. For RTAs between countries with different levels of development the addition of technology-related provision could have detrimental effects on exports in the short run, but this depends on the depth of the RTAs. For deep and comprehensive trade agreements the additional trade effect tends to be positive for almost all trade flows, with only exports from developed to developing countries showing small negative effects. The good news is that, for the most part, our results support the inclusion of intellectual property related provisions in the RTAs, given that those provisions seem to exert an additional positive effect on trade, even for shallow RTAs. Conversely, provisions related to technology transfer, R&D and technical cooperation might be looser and hence less effective.

In certain circumstances, the existence of provisions may not be enough in itself to guarantee effective technology transfer. To complement them, it may be necessary to create appropriate enforcement mechanisms to build on the vague provisions in trade agreements. These might take the form of monitoring committees formed of representatives from both parties whose sole function is to ensure compliance with these provisions. Establishing binational parliamentary committees is another such possibility. Footnote 27

The WTO laid the groundwork for technology transfer through TRIPs and has urged developed countries to create reports to document the steps they have taken to apply the articles on cooperation in their relations with lower-income countries. In line with these commitments, it is important to continuously assess the impact of agreements, especially the aspects that relate to technology transfer, an issue which is by nature constantly changing. By estimating how RTAs containing different types of innovation and technology transfer provisions affect trade, this study is intended as a step in this direction.

The main results suggest that it is important for agreements to include such provisions, particularly if they are to be effective at increasing medium-technology exports from new industrialized countries to developing countries, which in turn facilitates knowledge and technology transfer between countries and generates technology spillovers.

To distinguish between the effects of the provisions depending on the enforcement mechanisms that are set out in the RTAs, this study could be extended by classifying RTA provisions according to how stringently they are enforced. Alternatively, a more straightforward approach could be to see whether effects vary depending on levels of rule of law and the effectiveness of governance in exporter countries.

We also leave for future research the estimation of the effects of RTAs containing innovation and technology provisions on the technological level of the countries that ratify such agreements, distinguishing between the pure trade effect effects and those that are due to direct technology transfer. To that end, the trade predictions obtained from the gravity model could be included, together with proxies for participation in RTAs with those provisions, in a model of the determinants of R&D expenditure and innovative activity.

Change history

30 june 2021.

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-021-00427-0

We use the WTO definition of RTAs: “RTAs, which are reciprocal preferential trade agreements between two or more partners, constitute one of the exemptions and are authorized under the WTO, subject to a set of rules”. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm .

The authors estimate a traditional gravity model that disregards multilateral resistance factors, the exclusion of which is known to generate biases in the estimated coefficients of the RTA dummies (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007 ).

For this purpose, we chose the UNCTAD classification of goods that differentiates between high, medium and low technological content. In relation to countries, we use the United Nations definition, which for 2017 lists developed (North) and developing countries (South).

Some provisions on technology transfer address the interests of strategic sectors, such as laboratories in the case of patents or intellectual property, or industrial sectors supported by the government and for which cooperation in technological matters is included.

In all of these cases, the effects do not derive exclusively from trade between the signatory countries, but also from the specific cooperation instruments that are used as vehicles for RTAs.

The TRIPs agreement is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property. It came into effect in 1995.

Another possibility would be to distinguish between the sectoral impact on agricultural trade, industrial trade or even trade in services; we leave this extension for further research. The North–South division allows us to analyze the impact of the treaties when they are signed by countries with the same or different levels of development, considering ‘North’ as developed countries and ‘South’ as developing countries, following the UN distinction as we see later in the paper.

The mechanism is direct when these provisions entail cooperation, technical assistance, regulatory changes or enforcement mechanisms. For example, the EU-CARIFORUM agreement covers support for the promotion of innovation, diversification, modernization, development and product and process quality in businesses and in the intensification of activities promoting those links. It also provides enforcement mechanisms concerning intellectual property rights, including corrective measures and penalties in case of infringement.

An additional technology transfer mechanism may be mergers or acquisitions with foreign FDI, where new technologies spill over into the host sector. In fact, the exchange of goods, services or ideas (people) can lead to technology transfer, even through informal channels, or through educational exchange programs. In this paper we only study one specific mechanism.

In a previous version, we included Partial Scope Agreements (PSA) and Economic Cooperation Agreements (ECA) examining a total of 302 agreements. We have eliminated them from this section since the empirical analysis only considers RTAs that are at least FTAs.

We consider the full set of free trade agreements that have been notified to the WTO up to December 2016, in keeping with the methodology proposed by Hofmann et al. ( 2018 ). The authors classified trade agreements based on the provisions they include on different aspects such as environment, labor, social and intellectual property rights issues. In the empirical analysis we restrict the sample to those RTAs signed after 1994, since trade data from UNCTAD disaggregated by technological content are only available from 1995 onwards.

Shallow integration involves the elimination of barriers to the movement of goods and services across national borders within the RTA, whereas deep integration involves establishing or expanding the institutional enviornment in order to facilitate trade.

Multilateral resistance terms reflect relative trade costs with respect to the rest of the world. This concept was introduced by Anderson and van Wincoop ( 2003 ) into the gravity model. Bilateral trade is not only affected by bilateral interactions, but also by interactions with the rest of the world.

Other geographical factors that vary by country, such as the geographic area ( Area ) of countries i and j and dummy variables that indicate whether they have access to the sea ( Landlock ) have also been used in the traditional gravity literature.

It is important to include this variable as agreements that include technology provisions could have a different effect on trade for all types of exports depending on whether the agreements are deep and comprehensive, or only shallow. The correlation between RTA_depth and RTA_tech is low.

For the implementation of this estimation method, the newly available Stata command ppml_panel_sg (Zylkin, 2017 ) was employed.

While the data extracted from UNCTAD did not contain any zeros, balancing the data to obtain all possible importer, exporter and year combinations led to a large number of observations for which trade values were missing, either because they were not reported or they were actually zero.

Yotov et al. ( 2016 ) (p. 19) presents five possible solutions to this problem.

The first column in Table 8 presents the estimations using traditional gravity variables. In the second column, variables that vary by country are replaced by origin and destination fixed effects, and in the third column bilateral variables are replaced by dyadic fixed effects. The traditional gravity variables present the expected signs and magnitudes; the GDP coefficients are close to the theoretical value of one in column (1); distance, area and landlocked variables show negative and significant coefficients, and sharing a border, an official language or colonial ties all increase trade significantly, as expected. WTO membership, TRIPs and common currency all show positive and significant effects on total exports, which decrease in magnitude when controlling for country-time and pair fixed effects in column (4).

The command ppml_panel_sg, written by Zylkin ( 2017 ), was used ("symmetric pair effects" option is appropriate for identification if all main variables are symmetric with respect to direction of trade, Zylkin post: Statalist 8th November 2017).

According to Bergstrand et al. ( 2015 ), PPML estimates tend to be larger than OLS estimates for RTAs.

Compared with 14% for RTA_tech in column 4, Table 8 .

As usual, the percentage increase in trade attributed to RTAs is obtained by applying the exponential (anti-log) to the estimated coefficient, subtracting 1, and multiplying by 100.

Full results are available in the Appendix (Table 9 ).

We use the United Nations definition, which for 2017 lists developed countries as being Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Bulgaria (BGR), Canada (CAN), Croatia (HRV), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Rep. (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Malta (MLT), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), United Kingdom (GBR), and United States (USA).

Using a test of linear combinations of the coefficients: lincom in Stata. Results available upon request.

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Funding was provided by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Grant No. CO2017-83255-C3-3-P (AEI, FEDER, EU)), Universitat Jaume I (Grant No. UJI-B2020-57), Generalitat Valenciana (Grant No. Prometeo 2018-108).

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See Tables 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 and Figs. 3 , 4 , 5 .

Source : Compiled by the authors based on RTAs and exports (UNCTAD). Lexp is ln of high-tech exports. Years 1995 to 2017

Distribution of high-technology-content exports by type of agreement.

Source : Compiled by the authors based on RTAs and exports (UNCTAD). Lxmtet is ln of medium-tech exports. Years 1995 to 2017

Distribution of medium-technology-content exports by type of agreement.

Source : Compiled by the authors based on RTAs and exports (UNCTAD). Lxltet is ln of low-tech exports. Years 1995 to 2017

Distribution of low-technology-content exports by type of agreement.

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Martínez-Zarzoso, I., Chelala, S. Trade agreements and international technology transfer. Rev World Econ 157 , 631–665 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-021-00420-7

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Climate change is a serious challenge facing countries. Least developed countries (LDCs) are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts due to a lack of adequate resources, particularly technological resources, required to mitigate/adapt to climate change impacts within their territories. Some international agreements recognize this technology challenge faced by LDCs and thus provide for technology transfer from developed countries to LDCs. One of such agreements is the Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement specifically provides for technology transfer from developed countries to least developed countries. However, it is difficult to enforce this provision before the WTO adjudicatory bodies. This is because the provision is broadly worded, and this is exacerbated by the fact that the TRIPS agreement recognizes intellectual property rights (IPRs) as private rights. As a result, it may be difficult to compel state governments to transfer technology, especially where they do not have the relevant patent right or control of the technology or invention. Although it may be difficult to enforce Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement through WTO adjudicatory bodies, the provision has been recognized as binding. 

At the meeting of the Council for TRIPS on 1st and 2nd December 1998, it was suggested that information should be requested from developed country members on how Article 66.2 was being implemented. This suggestion was adopted as a formal decision of the Council on 19th February 2003, and based on this, developed country members are required to submit annual reports on actions taken or planned in accordance with the provisions of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement. Although this provision refers to technology transfer in general, developed countries also report on the transfer of climate technology. For example, the United Kingdom, through the programme , ‘Building Urban Resilience to Climate Change in Tanzania’, facilitates the transfer of technology in areas related to the use of survey drones and mapping instruments. Also, the United States runs a programme, Ambassador’s Water Expert Programme (AWEP) in Uganda. Under this programme, the US sends hydrologists to Uganda to provide technical assistance for water security amongst other objectives. Japan, through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) runs a programme in Sudan, which is aimed at developing climate change resilient technologies for sustainable wheat production.

At the WTO annual TRIPS workshop in March 2021, Ambassador Ahmad Makaila of Chad , on behalf of the LDCs Group indicated that “modest progress has been made” with regards to technology transfer, including climate technology transfer, “but much remains to be done”. This raises a question that touches on the nature of developed countries’ obligations under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement. For example, there is the question of whether the obligation of developed countries under Article 66.2 of TRIPS agreement is ad infinitum ? Unlike Article 66.1 of the TRIPS agreement, there is no timeline or completion date for the implementation of Article 66.2. However, a response to this can only be deduced from the provisions of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement.

Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement expressly provides that:

‘Developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base’. 

It can be deduced from this provision that Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement is comprised of two parts, an obligation and an objective. The obligation is for developed countries to provide incentives to promote technology transfer’, while the objective is to ‘create a sound and viable technological base’. Based on the reports submitted by developed countries, this obligation is being implemented to an extent. Nonetheless, it is necessary to ask whether the objective of Article 66.2 of TRIPS agreement is being achieved. This leads to our main question: is the obligation under Article 66.2 of TRIPS agreement ad infinitum ? The answer to this question can be deduced from the second part, that is the objective, of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement.

The objective for such incentives is to enable LDCs to set up ‘a sound and viable technological base’. Based on this, the obligation of developed countries to implement Article 66.2 ends when LDCs are able to ‘create a sound and viable technological base’. This raises further questions on the definition of a sound and viable technological base, who determines whether LDCs have attained a sound and viable base, and how long would it take for LDCs to have a sound and viable technological base? The answers to these questions lie with the LDCs as this depends on the extent to which LDCs assimilate the technology transferred by developed countries. This would require LDCs to report on technology transfer projects going on in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement impliedly requires LDCs to report on whether the objective, sound, and viable technological base, has been achieved. 

On the other hand, LDCs may be exempted from fulfilling the obligation of providing a report. Article 66.1 of the TRIPS agreement allows LDC members to submit a request for a transition period, this request exempts LDCs members from performing the obligations under the TRIPS agreement. Further to request from the LDC Group, the council of TRIPS extended the transition period from 1st July 2021 to 1st July 2034. This extension means that LDC members are not required to comply with any provision of the TRIPS agreement, except Articles 3,4 and 5. Despite this, there are a number of reasons why LDCs should submit a report pursuant to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement.

Firstly, considering that developed countries spend several millions of dollars in pursuing an objective, it is important to know if the pursued objective is being achieved or not, and a report on this should not be based solely on reports submitted by developed countries. Secondly, an annual report from LDCs would prevent duplication of efforts and thus ensure that technology is transferred to areas where technical support is needed. Furthermore, a report from LDCs would promote transparency and accountability, and therefore ensure the sustainability of the projects or initiatives implemented by developed countries.

In conclusion, the transfer of technology is essential to address climate change concerns. Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement requires developed countries to provide incentives to facilitate the transfer of climate technology to LDCs. This obligation is not ad infinitum as it ends when the objective is achieved. The Council of TRIPS requires developed countries to produce an annual report on how Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement is implemented. However, there is a need to require LDCs to report on how achievements made under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS agreement is being sustained and the steps taken to establish a ‘sound and viable technological base’ based on the support provided by developed countries.

Frances Nwadike is a Ph.D. candidate at Newcastle University Law School.

Suggested citation: Frances Nwadike, Article 66.2 of TRIPS Agreement: LDCs and Technology Transfer, July 31, 2020, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/07/frances-nwadike-trips-ldc/.

This article was prepared for publication by Vishwajeet Deshmukh , a JURIST staff editor. Please direct any questions or comments to her at [email protected]

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The Role of the TRIPS Agreement in International Intellectual Property Protection

Introduction.

The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement , established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), stands as a pivotal instrument in the realm of international intellectual property (IP) protection. Enacted in 1994, the TRIPS Agreement marked a significant turning point by integrating intellectual property concerns into the framework of global trade. This article delves into the multifaceted role of the TRIPS Agreement, exploring its origins, key provisions, impact on international trade, and its evolving relevance in the contemporary landscape of intellectual property protection.

Historical Context

To comprehend the importance of the TRIPS Agreement, it is crucial to understand the historical context that led to its creation. Before the establishment of the WTO, international trade agreements lacked a comprehensive framework for addressing intellectual property issues. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, conducted from 1986 to 1994, sought to rectify this gap by developing a unified approach to intellectual property on a global scale.

The TRIPS Agreement emerged as a landmark achievement during the Uruguay Round, as it marked the first time that intellectual property rights were systematically integrated into the international trading system. The agreement aimed to strike a balance between the interests of developed and developing countries, recognizing the need for protection and the imperative of fostering innovation and economic development.

Key Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement

The TRIPS Agreement comprises a set of provisions that outline the minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of various forms of intellectual property. These standards cover patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and other related rights. Some of the key provisions include:

a. Patent Protection

The TRIPS Agreement mandates member countries to provide patent protection for inventions, both products and processes, across all fields of technology. The agreement establishes a minimum patent term of 20 years from the filing date and delineates the criteria for patentability, including novelty, inventiveness, and industrial applicability.

b. Copyright and Related Rights

The agreement addresses copyright protection , requiring member countries to grant authors exclusive rights over their literary, artistic, and musical works. It also covers related rights, such as those of performers, producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations. The minimum copyright term is set at 50 years, with flexibility for longer terms.

c. Trademarks

TRIPS mandates the protection of trademarks, requiring member countries to provide a minimum level of protection for registered trademarks. This includes the prohibition of the unauthorized use of identical or similar signs for identical or similar goods and services.

d. Enforcement Mechanisms

The TRIPS Agreement establishes enforcement mechanisms to ensure the effective protection of intellectual property rights. It includes provisions for civil and administrative procedures, provisional measures, and border measures to prevent the entry of counterfeit goods.

Impact on International Trade

The TRIPS Agreement significantly impacts international trade by integrating intellectual property considerations into the broader framework of the WTO. Intellectual property rights have become a vital aspect of global commerce, influencing trade patterns, investment decisions, and technology transfer. The following aspects highlight the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on international trade:

a. Technology Transfer

One of the primary objectives of the TRIPS Agreement is to promote the transfer of technology between developed and developing countries. By establishing a minimum standard of intellectual property protection, the agreement seeks to create a conducive environment for the flow of technology and knowledge across borders.

b. Market Access and Investment

Intellectual property protection, as mandated by the TRIPS Agreement, has become a crucial factor in market access and foreign investment decisions. Countries with robust intellectual property regimes are often perceived as more attractive for foreign investment, as companies seek to protect their innovations and technologies in jurisdictions with effective legal frameworks.

c. Dispute Resolution

The TRIPS Agreement provides a mechanism for dispute resolution within the WTO framework. Member countries can bring disputes related to intellectual property rights violations to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body , fostering a rules-based approach to resolving conflicts and ensuring compliance with TRIPS obligations.

Challenges and Criticisms

While the TRIPS Agreement has undoubtedly played a pivotal role in harmonizing international intellectual property standards, it has not been without challenges and criticisms. Some of the key issues raised include:

a. Access to Medicines

One of the most contentious issues relates to the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on access to essential medicines, particularly in developing countries. Critics argue that stringent patent protection can hinder the production and availability of affordable generic medicines, posing a barrier to public health initiatives.

b. Technology Transfer Disparities

Despite the intention to promote technology transfer , the TRIPS Agreement has been criticized for exacerbating disparities in technology access between developed and developing nations. The capacity of developing countries to fully engage in research and development may be constrained by the need to adhere to stringent intellectual property standards.

c. Flexibility and Policy Space

Developing countries have advocated for greater flexibility and policy space within the TRIPS framework to address their unique developmental needs. This includes the ability to adopt measures such as compulsory licensing and the limitation of exclusive rights in certain situations to balance public health concerns and industrial development.

Evolving Relevance in the Contemporary Landscape

As the global landscape continues to evolve, the relevance of the TRIPS Agreement remains a subject of ongoing debate. Several factors contribute to its evolving significance:

a. Technological Advancements

Rapid advancements in technology, especially in fields like biotechnology and digital innovation, pose new challenges for intellectual property regimes. The TRIPS Agreement, crafted in the pre-digital era, may need to adapt to address emerging issues such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, and gene editing.

b. Public Health Imperatives

The ongoing global health challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have reignited discussions about the balance between intellectual property protection and public health imperatives. The TRIPS Agreement has faced calls for temporary waivers of certain intellectual property rights to facilitate widespread access to vaccines and treatments.

c. Sustainable Development Goals

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emphasize the importance of balancing economic growth with social and environmental considerations. The TRIPS Agreement is increasingly viewed through the lens of its impact on sustainable development, requiring a nuanced approach to intellectual property that considers broader societal goals.

Future Prospects and Potential Reforms

As the international community grapples with the challenges and opportunities presented by the TRIPS Agreement, discussions about potential reforms and future prospects have gained momentum. Some areas of consideration include:

a. Flexibility and Development

Future reforms could focus on enhancing flexibility within the TRIPS framework to accommodate the diverse needs and development priorities of member countries. This may involve revisiting certain provisions to strike a more equitable balance between intellectual property protection and development objectives.

b. Access to Medicines

The debate surrounding access to medicines is likely to persist, with ongoing discussions about the role of intellectual property in responding to public health emergencies. Reforms could explore mechanisms to ensure timely and affordable access to critical medical technologies during health crises.

c. Technology Transfer and Capacity Building

Efforts to facilitate technology transfer and capacity building, especially for developing countries, could be a key area for future reforms. Collaborative initiatives, partnerships, and international cooperation may be promoted to address the technology gap between nations.

The TRIPS Agreement stands as a landmark in the history of international intellectual property protection, reshaping the landscape of global trade and innovation. While it has played a crucial role in establishing minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property, challenges and criticisms persist. As the world grapples with evolving technologies, public health crises, and sustainable development

goals, the TRIPS Agreement faces the imperative of adapting to meet the needs of a rapidly changing global landscape. The ongoing discourse surrounding the agreement underscores the importance of finding a delicate balance between protecting intellectual property rights and addressing broader societal imperatives in the pursuit of a more equitable and sustainable future.

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Home > JOURNALS > HASTINGS_SCIENCE_TECHNOLOGY_LAW_JOURNAL > Vol. 10 (2019) > No. 1

UC Law Science and Technology Journal

Technology transfer and the trips agreement are developed countries meeting their end of the bargain.

David M. Fox

International trade agreements often integrate provisions requiring the transfer of technology from developed to least-developed countries under the assumption that technological development in the world’s poorest countries will help solve pressing global concerns. At first, supplying tangible hardware and equipment to least-developed countries satisfied these trade obligations. Today, however, modern development theory calls for a broader understanding of “technology” to include knowledge, skills, and human resource development. Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement instructs developed country Members to incentivize domestic enterprises and institutions “for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members.” Least-developed countries protest that developed-country Members do not fulfill their obligations under Article 66.2, and that WTO enforcement of this provision does not satisfy current economic development standards. This paper looks critically at Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and discusses whether developed countries are ensuring the successful flow of technology to resource-poor countries. Concluding that developed countries do not meet the Article 66.2 mandate, this paper outlines how the WTO may ensure the international community works to address the world’s most demanding needs.

Recommended Citation

David M. Fox, Technology Transfer and the TRIPS Agreement Are Developed Countries Meeting Their End of the Bargain? , 10 H astings S ci. & T ech . L.J. 1 (2019). Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_science_technology_law_journal/vol10/iss1/2

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I met a man on a business trip and left my marriage to be with him. I have no regrets.

• Nicole Fallon-Peek met her now-husband Sean during a business trip to Boston in 2017.
• After leaving her previous marriage, Fallon-Peek and Sean began a long-distance relationship.
• Once he moved to be with her, they quit their jobs and started their own business together.

This as-told-to essay is based on a conversation with Nicole Fallon-Peek, the co-CEO of Lightning Media Partners. The following has been edited for length and clarity.

I met my now-husband, Sean, in 2017 while we were working for the same digital publishing company.

I worked out of the New York office as a managing editor, and Sean worked out of the Ogden, Utah, office as an assistant managing editor. I was on the same level as his boss, but we didn't work directly with or for each other.

There was an instant spark when we met

We met on a business trip to our Boston office. It was my first business trip, and I was excited to connect with new people. I had no idea that one of those people would later become my husband.

I knew of Sean because we'd been on virtual meetings before, but I'd never spoken to him. When we met in the office that morning, we both knew there was a connection. I joke that it was love at first handshake.

He was one of the nicest, most charming people I'd ever met. He was very polite, but he wasn't afraid of a little self-deprecating humor .

We went to the hotel bar every night with colleagues and flirted with each other the entire time. We're big foodies, so when we'd go out to team dinners, I'd ask him if I could try something from his plate.

I was married to someone else then, but I didn't feel guilty because it felt so natural to be talking and laughing with Sean — like we'd known each other forever despite having just met.

Our goodbye on that trip was awkward. When I came down to the hotel lobby to check out, I saw him sitting there waiting for his Uber to the airport. We met each other's eyes and smiled, but we didn't get a chance to say goodbye because he was already gone by the time I'd checked out.

We found ways to spend more time together virtually during the workday

Sean and I emailed to trade phone numbers after the trip because we felt silly asking each other in person. We tried to be professional and draw a line. If we were talking about work things, we would communicate on work platforms, but I would text Sean sometimes during work to talk about personal stuff.

We found an excuse to schedule a one-on-one call to discuss a project one of our mutual colleagues was working on. We talked about the actual business purpose of the call and then went on for another 30 minutes talking about personal stuff.

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That call was it for me. I thought, "This could definitely be something real."

Meeting Sean was the confirmation I needed to leave my marriage

Before I met Sean, I was already one foot out the door of my previous marriage , but meeting him was the catalyst to finally leave.

It took less than two weeks for me to realize I was head over heels in love with Sean. He told me he didn't want to be the sole reason I ended my marriage, but I ended it because I wasn't happy.

My ex-spouse sensed my unhappiness and wasn't surprised when I shared those feelings, but they were definitely shocked and hurt that I'd realized it because I met someone else.

I do feel bad about the emotional pain I caused them, but we both said to each other and to family and friends that we're better off for having split up. It would've happened at some point regardless of whether Sean was in the picture.

I was nervous to tell my coworkers I left my marriage for someone at the company

I was a little nervous to share that I had left my marriage and was dating someone who worked in our Utah office. Sean and I also didn't know the policy as we'd never had a reason to look — neither of us thought we'd meet our soulmate at work.

We kept talking after the business trip and decided to make things official. Two months later, we told our bosses. We didn't want people at work to find out from the company rumor mill.

I sat my boss down and said, "Hey, I just want to tell you that we've been long-distance dating. I hope that's not a problem. We don't report to each other, so we figured maybe it'll be OK."

My boss was super happy for me. She said, "I knew it! You guys are great. This is not a problem. Do your thing. It's all good." Everyone else at the office was happy that I was happy. They knew I struggled in my previous relationship.

My boss helped Sean transfer to New York

My boss helped Sean get an opportunity on another team in the New York office a few months later. I was also looking for a place to live at that time so I told him that even though it was kind of soon, our relationship was on a good track and I wanted to move in together. He agreed.

We found a place, started commuting into the office together, and spent as much time as we could to make up for not being able to see each other every day during those four months of our long-distance relationship.

We decided to start our own venture

We eventually both felt stuck in our jobs and didn't see opportunities for growth. We had similar skills and knew we could work together — and we had already talked about marriage and starting a family — so we decided to start our own business. We quit together in 2018.

Our decision to start Lightning Media Partners has paid off. We had some business friction early on — I'm a "jump first, ask questions later" person and Sean is the opposite, but we've worked through it.

We got married in November 2019 and now have a 10-month-old daughter.

If you meet your soulmate at work, go for it

If you meet your soulmate at work and are both committed to the relationship, just go for it. Jobs come and go. If you have to choose between a career and the love of your life, go for love.

That's the hopeless romantic in me, but I don't regret a single decision I made once I met Sean. My career and personal life are both better for it.

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Federal Laboratory Consortium Recognizes DOD Technology Transfer Award Winners at 50th Anniversary Celebration

Department of Defense organizations will take home nine awards for technology transfer at the national meeting of the Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) on April 9-11, 2024, in Dallas, Texas. This year's meeting marks the 50th anniversary of the FLC, the formally chartered, nationwide network of over 300 federal laboratories, agencies, and research centers. Since the consortium's inception, DoD has been a committed partner in advancing the FLC's mission to foster commercialization, best practice strategies, and opportunities for accelerating federal technologies out of the lab and into the marketplace.

"The DoD technology transfer program is as strong as ever, as reflected in its impressive showing in this year's FLC awards. Congratulations to the awardees and their labs, leaders, and components — and thank you to the entire T2 federal workforce for your contributions to our nation's economy and security," said Dr. P. Kim Pham, director of Technology Transfer and Commercial Partnerships within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Seven DoD agencies, centers and laboratories, led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center, will receive recognition across four organizational categories and three individual/team categories for leadership and service in advancing technology transfer. 

Congratulations to the DoD's 2024 FLC award winners:

Excellence in Technology Transfer

• Defense Information Systems Agency, "DISA Accelerates Cloud Adoption in the DoD" (Jon Williams, Quanita Bost, Shanon Woods, Stephen M. Wallace, and Dave Lagos)
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center, "SUBMAT: A Temporary Roadway System Ingeniously Solves a Long-Standing Problem" (Dr. Timothy Rushing, Zachary Tyler, Stanley Boc, Alicia Bounds, Allison Hudson, Melissa Keen, Chris Rayer, Larry Schemmel, and Christine Bell)
• MIT Lincoln Laboratory, "Timely Address Space Randomization (TASR)" (Dr. Hamed Okhavi, Jason Martin, Dr. David Bigelow, Dr. William Streilein, Thomas Hobson, and Robert Rudd)

Technology Transfer Innovation Award

• Defense Health Agency, "Assistive Technology Transfer: Moving Military Technology from Concept to Product" (Barry Datlof, C. Blake Sajonia, Ronald Marchessault, Leigh Callander, Marlana (Titus) Chapin, William Schrot, and Neche Harris)

Impact Award

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center, "Rapidly Deployed Modular Protective System Guard Tower for Counterinsurgency Operations" (Bradford Steed, Dr. Tyler Oesch, Matthew Holmer, Amy (Allen) Douglass, Andrew Edwards, Christie Bell, Brian Jones, and Eric Fox)

Interagency Partnership Award

• DoD Geotechnical and Structures Laboratory, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center, DHS Science and Technology Directorate, and DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Office for Bombing Prevention, "ERDC-DHS Collaboration Achieves Far-Reaching Perimeter Security Solutions" (Justin Roberts, Omar Esquilin-Mangual, August Johnson, William Hossley, James Davis, Ali Fadel, and Eric Keenan)

Rookie of the Year Award

• Stacy Mills, 711th Human Performance Wing, Air Force Research Laboratory

Harold Metcalf Award for FLC Service 

• Jenna Dix, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division

Outstanding Researcher/Small Research Team Award 

• Sustainment Management System Team, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center (Lance Marrano and Mathew Walters)

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Q&A: Tips for viewing the 2024 solar eclipse

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On Monday, April 8, the United States will experience a total solar eclipse — a rare astronomical event where the moon passes directly between the sun and the Earth, blocking out the sun’s light almost completely. The last total solar eclipse in the contiguous U.S. was in 2017, and the next one won’t be until 2044.

If the weather cooperates, people across the United States — from northeastern Maine to southwestern Texas — will be able to observe the eclipse using protective eyewear. Those in the path of totality , where the moon entirely covers the sun, will have the best view, but 99% of people in the continental U.S. will be able to see a partial eclipse. Weather permitting, those on the MIT campus and the surrounding area will see 93 percent of the sun covered, with the partial eclipse starting at 2:15 p.m. and reaching its peak around 3:29 p.m. Gatherings are planned at the Kresge Oval and the MIT Museum , and a live NASA stream will be shown in the Building 55 atrium .

Brian Mernoff , manager of the CommLab in the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, is an accomplished astrophotographer and science educator. Mernoff is headed to Vermont with his family to experience the totality from the best possible angle — but has offered a few thoughts on how to enjoy the eclipse safely, wherever you are.

Q: What should viewers expect to see and experience with this solar eclipse?

A: When you’re watching TV (the sun) and your toddler, dog, or other large mammal (the moon) blocks your view, you no doubt move over a bit to try to get a partial or full view of the TV. This is exactly how the path of totality works for an eclipse. If you are exactly in line with the moon and sun, it will be completely blocked, but if you start moving away from this path, your view of the sun will start to increase until the moon is not in the way at all.

The closer you are to the path of totality, the more of the sun will be blocked. At MIT, about 93 percent of the sun will be blocked. Those in the area will notice that things around you will get slightly darker, just like when it starts to become overcast. Even so, the sun will remain very bright in the sky and solar glasses will be required to view the entirety of the eclipse. It really goes to show how incredibly bright the sun is!

Within the narrow path of totality, the moon will continue to move across the sun, reaching 100 percent coverage. For this short period of time, you can remove your glasses and see a black disk where the sun should be. Around the disk will be wispy white lines. This is the corona, the outermost part of the sun, which is normally outshone by the sun’s photosphere (surface). Around the edges of the black disk of the moon, right as totality begins and ends, you can also see bright spots around the edges, known as Bailey’s Beads, caused by sunlight shining between mountains and craters on the moon.

But that’s not all! Although you will be tempted to stare up at the sun throughout totality, do not forget to observe the world around you. During totality, it feels like twilight. There is a 360-degree sunset, the temperature changes rapidly, winds change, animals start making different sounds, and shadows start getting weird (look into “shadow bands” if you have a chance).

As soon as totality ends, and you start to see Baily’s Beads again, put your solar glasses back on as it will get very bright again very fast as the moon moves out of the way.

Q: What are the best options for viewing the eclipse safely and to greatest effect?

A: No matter where you are during the eclipse, make sure you have solar glasses. These glasses should be ISO-approved for solar viewing. Do not use glasses with scratches, holes, or other damage.

If you are unable to obtain solar glasses in time, you can safely view the eclipse using a home-made projection method , such as a pinhole camera or even projecting the image of the sun through a colander.

The best view of the eclipse will be from within the path of totality, but even if you are not within it, you should still go outside to experience the partial eclipse. Use the NASA Eclipse Explorer to find the start, maximum, and end times, and then find a nice spot outside — preferably with some shade — put on your glasses, and enjoy the show.

For a closer view of the sun, find a friend that has a telescope with the correct ISO-certified solar filter. This will let you see the photosphere (or chromosphere if it is an H-alpha scope) in a lot more detail. If you do not have access to a telescope, NASA plans to livestream a telescope view throughout the eclipse. [The livestream will be displayed publicly on a large screen in Building 55 at MIT, rain or shine.]

The only time you can look at or image the sun without a filter is during 100 percent totality. As soon as this period is done, glasses and filters must be put back on.

After the eclipse, keep your glasses and filters. You can use them to look at the sun on any day (it took me an embarrassing amount of time to realize that I could use the glasses at any time instead of lugging out a telescope). On a really clear day, you can sometimes see sunspots!

Q: How does eclipse photography work?

A: This year I plan to photograph the eclipse in two ways. The first is using a hydrogen-alpha telescope. This telescope filters out all light except for one wavelength that is given off by hydrogen. Because it blocks out most of the light from the sun’s surface, it allows you to see the turbulent upper atmosphere of the sun, including solar prominences that follow magnetic field lines.

Because this telescope does not allow for imaging during totality as too much light is blocked, I also plan to set up a regular camera with a wide-angle lens to capture the total eclipse with the surrounding environment as context. During the 2017 eclipse, I only captured close-ups of the sun using a regular solar filter and missed the opportunity to capture what was going on around me.

Will it work? That depends on if we get clear skies, and how many pictures of my 1.5-year-old need to be taken (as well as how much chasing needs to be done).

If you would like to take pictures of the eclipse, make sure you protect your camera sensor. The sun can easily damage lenses, sensors, and other components. Here are some examples of solar damaged cameras . The solution is simple, though. If using a camera phone, you can take pictures through an extra pair of solar glasses, or even tape them to the phone. For cameras with larger lenses, you can buy cardboard filters that slide over the front of your camera or even buy ISO-approved solar film and make your own.

Q: Any fun, unique, cool, or interesting science facts about this eclipse to share?

A: If you want to get even more involved with the eclipse, there are many citizen science projects that plan to collect as much data as possible throughout the eclipse.

NASA is planning to run several experiments during the eclipse , and researchers with MIT Haystack Observatory will also be using four different technologies to monitor changes in the upper atmosphere , both locally and across the continent.

If you are interested in learning more about the eclipse, here are two of my favorite videos, one on “ unexpected science from a 0.000001 megapixel home-made telescope ” and one on solar eclipse preparation .

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MIT Haystack scientists prepare a constellation of instruments to observe the solar eclipse’s effects

Solar eclipse caused bow waves in Earth's atmosphere

Q&A: Richard Binzel on tips for observing the 2017 solar eclipse

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Biden Announces Student Debt Relief for Millions in Swing-State Pitch

During an appearance in Wisconsin, President Biden said 10 million borrowers could see debt relief of at least $5,000. The plan could help rally support among young voters.

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Biden Announces New Plan for Student Debt Relief

President biden announced a large-scale effort to help pay off federal student loans for more than 20 million borrowers..

Today, I’m proud to announce five major actions to continue to relieve student debt for more than 30 million Americans since I started my administration. And starting this fall, we plan to deliver up to $20,000 in interest relief to over 20 million borrowers and full forgiveness for millions more. [applause] I will never stop to deliver student debt relief and hardworking Americans. And it’s only in the interest of America that we do it. And again, it’s for the good of our economy that’s growing stronger and stronger, and it is, by freeing millions of Americans from this crushing debt of student debt. It means they can finally get on with their lives instead of being put — their lives being put on hold.

By Michael D. Shear

Reporting from Madison, Wis.

President Biden on Monday announced a large-scale effort to help pay off federal student loans for tens of millions of American borrowers, seeking an election-year boost by returning to a 2020 campaign promise that was blocked by the Supreme Court last year.

Mr. Biden’s new plan would reduce the amount that 25 million borrowers still owe on their undergraduate and graduate loans. It would wipe away the entire amount for more than four million Americans. Altogether, White House officials said, 10 million borrowers would see debt relief of $5,000 or more.

“While a college degree still is a ticket to the middle class, that ticket is becoming much too expensive,” Mr. Biden said during a speech to a small but enthusiastic audience filled with supporters. “Today, too many Americans, especially young people, are saddled with too much debt.”

Mr. Biden announced the plan in Madison, Wis., the capital of a critical swing state and a college town that symbolizes the president’s promise to make higher-education affordability a cornerstone of his economic agenda.

But it is a promise he has so far failed to achieve, largely because of legal challenges from Republicans and other critics. They accuse Mr. Biden of unlawfully using his executive authority to enact a costly transfer of wealth from taxpayers who have not taken out federal student loans to those who have.

Officials did not say how much the new plan would cost in coming years, but critics have said it could increase inflation and add to the federal debt by billions of dollars.

Mr. Biden said his new effort would help the economy by removing the drag of enormous debt from people who would otherwise not be able to buy a home or pursue a more economically sound future.

“We’re giving people a chance to make it,” Mr. Biden said. “Not a guarantee. Just a chance to make it.”

Mr. Biden’s announcement was a presidential do-over. In the summer of 2022, he put in motion a plan to wipe out $400 billion in student debt for about 43 million borrowers. That was blocked by the Supreme Court , which said he exceeded his authority. In the months since, Mr. Biden has waived small amounts of debt using existing programs. But now he is attempting a larger effort closer to the scale of his first try.

The original plan relied on a law called the HEROES Act, which the administration argued allowed the government to waive student debt during a national emergency like the Covid pandemic. The justices disagreed after Republican attorneys general and others challenged the debt waiver plan.

The new approach is different.

For months, Mr. Biden’s Education Department has been developing regulations using a long process authorized by the Higher Education Act. Instead of an across-the-board waiver of debt, the new approach targets five groups of borrowers: those whose loans have ballooned because of interest; borrowers who have been paying for decades; those who have economic hardship; people who qualify for existing debt relief programs but have not applied; and people whose loans come from schools that have since been denied certification or have lost eligibility for federal student aid programs.

Administration officials said because the new approach is based on a different law, it is more likely to survive the expected challenges. They said lawyers for the White House and the Education Department have studied the Supreme Court ruling and have designed the new program to make sure it does not violate the principles laid out by the justices.

But lawyers for those who oppose the approach are likely to argue that waiving the debt is unfair to those who already paid back their loans or never took out college loans in the first place. That argument helped sway the justices in the last case.

Neal McCluskey, the director of the Center for Educational Freedom at the Cato Institute, called the new plan “dangerous policy” that is unfair to taxpayers and would cause colleges and universities to raise their prices.

“The Constitution gives Congress, not the president, the authority to enact law, and the Supreme Court has already struck down a unilateral, mass student debt cancellation scheme by the Biden administration,” he said. “It would stick taxpayers with bills for debts other people chose for their own financial advancement.”

The legal challenges will likely take months to resolve, and that could leave the debt relief plan in limbo as voters go to the polls in November to choose between Mr. Biden and former President Donald J. Trump.

Members of Mr. Biden’s administration fanned out across the country on Monday to talk about the new plan, betting that it will rally support among voters who were disappointed that the court blocked the first one, which would have eliminated up to $20,000 in debt for tens of millions of borrowers. Vice President Kamala Harris held a round-table discussion with a teacher, a nurse and a social worker in Philadelphia. Miguel A. Cardona, the education secretary, spoke in New York City.

“We need you to stay in these jobs doing this work,” Ms. Harris said in the library of an elementary school. “And you shouldn’t have to make a decision about whether you serve or are able to pay your bills.”

But beyond the threat of legal action, the president faces steep obstacles just because of the calendar. The new plan has not yet been published in the Federal Register, which will kick off a required, monthslong public comment period before it can take effect. Officials said on Sunday only that they hoped some of the provisions would begin going into effect in “early fall” of this year.

Administration officials hope that the president’s supporters will give him credit for trying, even if many of the borrowers do not end up seeing any relief before they go to the ballot box. Andrew O’Neill, the legislative director for Indivisible, a liberal advocacy organization, praised Mr. Biden’s announcement.

“Progressives have led the fight for student debt cancellation, and Joe Biden has responded,” he said in a statement. “More than 30 million folks will now get relief from Biden’s programs. That’s a huge deal.”

White House officials have been scrambling for months to respond to the anger about student loans among the president’s base. In one poll released last month, more than 70 percent of young people said the issue of student loan forgiveness was “important” or “very important” to them as they make their decision in the 2024 election campaign.

Officials said the five groups of people targeted in the new plan will address most of the egregious issues that some borrowers have with their student loans.

People whose loans have grown beyond the amount they originally borrowed because of interest would have up to $20,000 of that interest wiped away, leaving them to repay only the amount they originally borrowed. People making less than $120,000 a year, or couples making less than $240,000, would qualify to have all of their interest forgiven.

Officials said that 23 million people would most likely have all of their interest-related balances waived from that provision.

About two million borrowers who already qualify to have their student loans waived under existing programs have not applied for relief. Under the new rules, the Education Department would be authorized to cancel the debt for those people without their having to apply.

People who took out federal student loans for undergraduate degrees and began repaying them more than 20 years ago would automatically have the debt canceled under the new plan. Graduate students who borrowed money and began repaying 25 years ago would have their debt canceled.

Officials said that about 2.5 million people would qualify under that rule.

People who borrowed money to attend colleges that have since lost their certification or their eligibility to participate in the federal student aid program would have their debt canceled. Officials did not say how many people that would affect. And people who are especially burdened with other expenses — such as high medical debt or child care — could apply to have their student loans forgiven.

Officials did not estimate how many people might qualify for what they called the “hardship” programs.

Nicholas Nehamas contributed reporting from Philadelphia.

Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent for The New York Times, covering President Biden and his administration. He has reported on politics for more than 30 years. More about Michael D. Shear