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How Cruise Missiles Work

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Tomahawk cruise missiles frequently appear in the news because they are the U.S. weapon of choice for a variety of quick-strike operations. With all of the missiles in the U.S. arsenal, have you ever wondered why cruise missiles seem to come up so often?

In this edition of HowStuffWorks , we will look at cruise missiles so that you can understand what they are, how they operate and why they are ideal for certain scenarios.

A cruise missile is basically a small, pilotless airplane . Cruise missiles have an 8.5-foot (2.61-meter) wingspan, are powered by turbofan engines and can fly 500 to 1,000 miles (805 to 1,610 km) depending on the configuration.

A cruise missile's job in life is to deliver a 1,000-pound (450-kg) high-explosive bomb to a precise location -- the target. The missile is destroyed when the bomb explodes. Since cruise missiles cost between $500,000 and $1,000,000 each, it's a fairly expensive way to deliver a 1,000-pound package.

Cruise missiles come in a number of variations (see the links at the end of the article for more information) and can be launched from submarines , destroyers or aircraft.

When you hear about hundreds of cruise missiles being fired at targets, they are almost always Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from destroyers.

Cruise missiles are 20 feet (6.25 meters) long and 21 inches (0.52 meters) in diameter. At launch, they include a 550-pound (250-kg) solid rocket booster and weigh 3,200 pounds (1450 kg).

The booster falls away once it has burned its fuel. The wings, tail fins and air inlet unfold, and the turbofan engine takes over.

This engine weighs just 145 pounds (65 kg) and produces 600 pounds of thrust burning RJ4 fuel. The fuel load is 800 to 1,000 pounds (about 450 kg) of fuel at launch, or approximately 150 gallons (600 liters). The missile has a cruising speed of 550 mph (880 kph).

The hallmark of a cruise missile is its incredible accuracy. A common statement made about the cruise missile is, "It can fly 1,000 miles and hit a target the size of a single-car garage." Cruise missiles are also very effective at evading detection by the enemy because they fly very low to the ground (out of the view of most radar systems ).

Four different systems help guide a cruise missile to its target:

• IGS - Inertial Guidance System
• Tercom - Terrain Contour Matching
• GPS - Global Positioning System
• DSMAC - Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation

The IGS is a standard acceleration-based system that can roughly keep track of where the missile is located based on the accelerations it detects in the missile's motion ( click here for a good introduction). Tercom uses an on-board 3-D database of the terrain the missile will be flying over. The Tercom system "sees" the terrain it is flying over using its radar system and matches this to the 3-D map stored in memory. The Tercom system is responsible for a cruise missile's ability to "hug the ground" during flight. The GPS system uses the military's network of GPS satellites and an onboard GPS receiver to detect its position with very high accuracy.

Once it is close to the target, the missile switches to a "terminal guidance system" to choose the point of impact. The point of impact could be pre-programmed by the GPS or Tercom system. The DSMAC system uses a camera and an image correlator to find the target, and is especially useful if the target is moving. A cruise missile can also be equipped with thermal imaging or illumination sensors (as used in smart bombs ).

Frequently Asked Questions

How do cruise missiles navigate to their target, what advancements have been made in cruise missile technology, lots more information, related articles.

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More Great Links

• USAF Fact Sheet: AGM-86B/C Missiles
• U.S. navy Fact File: Tomahawk Cruise Missile
• BBC News: NATO's firepower: The cruise missile
• Time.com: Tomahawk Cruise Missile
• Analysis: Tomahawks, Submarines and the F-111

Launch systems

• Arleigh Burke Class (AEGIS) Guided Missile Destroyers, USA
• SSN Los Angles Class Attack Submarine, USA - U.S. subs that launch cruise missiles
• SSN Astute Class Attack Submarine, UK - Royal Navy subs that launch cruise missiles
• B-52H Stratofortress Long-Range Multi-Role Bomber, USA
• B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber, USA

Miscellaneous

• Williams F107-WR-101 Turbofan Engine
• Digital Imagery Workstation Suite (DIWS) - generates the Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) reference scenes

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• Cruise Missile Basics

What is a cruise missile?

Cruise missiles, although similar to ballistic missiles in some regards, provide an alternate means to deliver a lethal payload rapidly and accurately to a target. Cruise missiles differ from ballistic missiles in that they fly towards their target at lower altitudes, remaining within the Earth’s atmosphere throughout their trajectory. Cruise missiles are defined as “an unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload on a target.” [1] Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned control-guided helicopters or aircraft can be included in this definition [2] , but will not be discussed on this page.

The cruise missile has its beginnings in World War I, when the U.S. Army developed the Kettering Bug, an unmanned aerial bomb designed to strike targets beyond the range of artillery and too dangerous for piloted aircraft. However, the Kettering Bug was never used in combat. [3] Instead, the modern cruise missile originates more from the V-1 Flying Bomb used by the Germany in the last months of World War II. [4]

Launch Platforms

Cruise missiles are capable of being launched from multiple ground, air, sea and submarine platforms. Both fighter and long-range bomber aircraft are capable of carrying and launching cruise missiles. [5] On the ground, cruise missiles are most commonly launched by road-mobile systems due to the inherent advantages of mobility, but they can also be launched from fixed platforms. [6]

Russian warships in the Caspian Sea launch Kalibr cruise missiles towards targets inside Syria.

At sea, various surface ships and submarines can launch cruise missiles. Submarines are capable of launching while surfaced or submerged using torpedo fixtures or vertical launch tubes. [7] In April 2010 Kontsern-Morinformsistema-Agat, a Russian company, began marketing a version of the Russian Kalibr cruise missile housed in and capable of being launched from a standard shipping container. [8] This would allow any vehicle capable of carrying a standard shipping container to become a discreet platform from which to launch cruise missiles. [9]

Propulsion and Flight

Cruise missiles utilize jet engines as their primary method of propulsion. Most cruise missiles are subsonic and use Turbofan and Turbojet engines. While less common, supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles utilize Ramjet and Scramjet engines. [10] Some also use rocket motor propulsion as a booster in the first phase of flight [11]  or to accelerate to supersonic speeds in the terminal phase. [12]

Cruise missiles can fly to their targets at varying altitudes as long as they remain within the atmosphere. The trajectory of most remains close to the Earth’s surface, sometimes skimming just meters above the ground. Their low flight path makes it much harder for most radar and sensor systems to detect the missile, unless the radar or sensor system is airborne and directed towards the ground. [13] Some cruise missiles will fly only at high altitudes and dive sharply down once they reach their target. Flying at high altitude can extend the range of the missile because it’s more fuel-efficient than flying at lower altitudes. However, this also makes the missile more susceptible to missile defense systems since today’s radars and sensors are typically positioned to detect and track high altitude threats. [14] Cruise missiles can also mix their flight trajectory between high and low altitude in order to get the benefits of both. In this instance, cruise missiles will typically fly at a high altitude early in their flight to help extend their range, but as they approach their target, or missile defenses, they will fly down to a lower sea skimming/terrain hugging altitude to help it evade detection and defenses. [15]

Flight test of Pakistan’s Ra’ad cruise missile.

Cruise missiles can use multiple guidance methods in order to accurately place their ordinance on the desired target and avoid missile defense systems. One of the first methods used by cruise missiles was inertial guidance, which is still used today and allows the missile to fly along a flight path programmed prior to launch. [16] Another guidance method is terrain contour matching (TERCOM), which compares a terrain map to the current terrain the missile is flying over to ensure the missile is flying on the correct path. [17] Some use GPS systems, which require connection to either GPS or GLONASS satellite system, but can help ensure the missile follows the correct flight path and strikes the final target using specific coordinates with a high degree of accuracy. [18]

Other guidance methods are primarily used in the terminal phase of flight to increase accuracy. One is a laser guided system which uses a sensor to detect its target painted by a laser, however this can be unreliable because dust and smoke can interfere with the laser or the missile may not always be able to see the laser or painted target. [19] Another terminal guidance method is TV guidance, in which an operator uses a camera in the nose of the missile to visually identify and manually guide the missile to the target in its final phase. This method also gives the operator the option to abort the strike in the final phase if an anomaly is detected. [20]  A radar seeker is also used in the nose of some missiles to identify and/or keep the missile on target in the terminal phase. These radar seekers use either passive radar, which detect radar emissions of their target, or active radar, which emit their own radar to detect their target. [21] Infrared (IR) guidance – directing the missile towards heat emitting objects, such as engines [22] – may also be used by cruise missiles in the terminal phase. [23] However, because of its simplicity, IR guidance cannot differentiate between friendly, adversarial, or extraneous IR signals in a crowded battlefield, and is usually used in conjunction with other guidance systems. [24] The last guidance system used by cruise missiles is Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC), which uses a camera in the missile to find the desired target and match it to a stored image using an image correlator. [25]

Cruise missiles are typically armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, but can also be equipped with chemical or biological warheads. [26] The warhead weight and yield can vary widely, depending on the specific cruise missile and its mission.

[1] “Cruise Missiles.” Federation of American Scientists. http://fas.org/nuke/intro/cm/

[3] “Kettering Bug.” UAVGLOBAL. http://www.uavglobal.com/kettering-bug/ ; “War Machines: Cruise Missile.” National Geographic. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AD8Kr0f1tEY

[4] Hickman, Kennedy. “World War II: V-1 Flying Bomb.” About Education. http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/artillerysiegeweapons/p/v1.htm

[5] N.R.P. “Explained: How Cruise Missiles Work!” Defencyclopedia. https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/

[8] Stott, Michael. “Deadly New Russian Weapon Hides in Shipping Container.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-weapon-idUSTRE63P2XB20100426

[9] Lewis, Jeffrey, Nikolai Sokov. “Sokov on Russian Cruise Missiles.” Arms Control Wonk. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207801/sokov-on-russian-cruise-missiles/

[11] Brain, Marshall. “How Cruise Missiles Work.” How Stuff Works. http://science.howstuffworks.com/cruise-missile.htm

[12] N.R.P. “Explained: How Cruise Missiles Work!” Defencyclopedia. https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/

[22] Kopp, Carlo. “Heat-Seeking Missile Guidance.” Air Power Australia. http://ausairpower.net/TE-IR-Guidance.html

[23] N.R.P. “Explained: How Cruise Missiles Work!” Defencyclopedia. https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/

[25] Brain, Marshall. “How Cruise Missiles Work.” How Stuff Works. http://science.howstuffworks.com/cruise-missile.htm

[26] “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.” Federation of American Scientists.   http://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/part02.htm ; Norris, Robert S., Hans M. Kristensen. “Nuclear Cruise Missiles.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. http://bos.sagepub.com/content/63/6/60.full

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A Short History of Cruise Missiles: The Go-To Weapons for Conventional Precision Strikes

The slow, stubby-winged cruise missile has become a major part of modern warfare. This is its story.

• They’re not like other missiles; instead, cruise missiles work more like drones.
• Ironically, the inspiration for the first cruise missiles involved pilots—the infamous kamikazes of World War II .

One weapon that establishes a military power in a completely different category from the rest is the cruise missile. Originally designed to deliver nuclear weapons at long distances, it’s become the go-to weapon for conventional precision strikes, and is currently front and center in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

But as the cruise missile is now in its fifth decade of use, there are signs it’ll need some adjustments to stay relevant on the modern battlefield .

Divine Wind

A cruise missile is a subsonic guided missile that uses a turbojet, a smaller version of the jet engines that power today’s airplanes , to reach its targets. Cruise missiles often have small, stubby wings to allow them to bank and turn, following an invisible flight path in the sky. Modern cruise missiles use satellite navigation to guide themselves to target, and some can even take pictures of the target area, allowing operators to retarget them in midair. The missile’s payload is typically a warhead in the 1,000-pound weight class, often with the ability to penetrate earth and concrete to target underground shelters.

The first cruise missiles were Japan’s kamikaze planes of World War II. The kamikaze, or “divine wind,” was part of the Japanese Special Attack Units. Created out of desperation and meant to curb the inexorable advance of U.S. forces across the Pacific, kamikaze pilots were sent on one-way missions to target ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The planes were loaded with explosives, and the pilots flew low and fast to avoid detection until the last possible moment.

Kamikaze missions were incredibly successful. In the first four months of their use, an estimated 34 percent of all kamikazes reached their targets. Much of their success is likely attributable to American forces’ disbelief that pilots could commit suicide for their mission. But the low-flying mission profile and the pilot’s ability to recognize threats and avoid them were also undoubtedly factors. In the 1970s, when U.S. military planners originally conceived of the cruise missile, the kamikazes were likely not far from anyone’s mind.

How Cruise Missiles Work

Cruise missiles were originally designed to carry nuclear weapons long distances, allowing bombers to strike their targets without entering the range of an adversary’s air-defense weapons. Conventional rocket-powered missiles didn’t fit the bill: rocket engines are designed to provide speed, and burn up fuel quickly. A cruise missile would need an enormous rocket engine to reach a distant target, with the result being a missile so big only a few would be able to fit inside a bomber.

Instead of rockets, engineers took a different tack: small turbofan engines that burn jet fuel. Turbofan engines are much more efficient, allowing a 21-foot-long missile to carry enough fuel to fly 1,000 miles, plus a 1,000-pound high-explosive warhead (or W-80 thermonuclear warhead ) and a guidance system. The downside was that a turbofan-powered cruise missile could not fly particularly fast, just about 500 miles per hour.

A subsonic cruise missile flying a straight flight path and unable to take evasive action would prove easy meat to any enemy interceptor that happened upon it. The first modern cruise missile, the American-made Tomahawk , was designed to fly low, less than 100 meters above the ground. This limited the range at which ground-based radars could detect a cruise missile, as radar waves conform to the curvature of Earth. This also frustrated enemy fighters, whose nose-mounted radars found it difficult to pick out a cruise missile against the clutter created by the ground below. While cruise missiles were too slow to become first-strike weapons, they were effective for retaliatory strikes against heavily defended airspace.

Early Tomahawk cruise missiles followed a pre-programmed flight path to target using a system called terrain contour matching (TERCOM). In TERCOM , a radar altimeter scans the terrain below the missile, then compares it to a terrain elevation map stored in its onboard computer brain. If the two match, the missile is on the right flight path; if they don’t match, the missile adjusts course. Programming TERCOM for a long-range mission was a notoriously time-consuming process, and had to be done at a computer terminal.

As the Tomahawk neared its target, it switched over to a completely different navigation system: digital scene matching and area correlation ( DSMAC ). DSMAC used an optical sensor that took pictures of the ground and compared them to actual sites on the final route to the target. Together, TERCOM and DSMAC delivered unheard of accuracy, allowing Tomahawks to fly hundreds of miles and strike specific parts of land targets, even specific parts of buildings.

More recent cruise missiles, including newer versions of the Tomahawk, have done away with the old navigation systems in favor of using GPS to guide themselves to a fixed target. This has had the effect of making an already accurate missile even more accurate—reportedly to within 32 feet of a target. The Tomahawk Block IV version, introduced in the 2010s, included a camera that could send back imagery to the missile’s controllers, allowing a missile to be re-tasked in midair if its target was already destroyed. Block Va, the latest version, adds the ability to target and attack moving ships at sea.

The Tomahawk missile was the first cruise missile fired in anger. U.S. Navy warships fired a total of 288 Tomahawks during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Tomahawk missiles have also been fired at Bosnia, Sudan, Syria , Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan. U.S. and U.K. forces have delivered just over 2,000 Tomahawk missiles against operational targets, with more than half against Iraq.

In recent years, other countries have also used cruise missiles in combat. In October 2017, Russia began cruise missile strikes against so-called terrorist targets in Syria. These Novator 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles are very similar to Tomahawk missiles, but use Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system, an alternative to the American GPS. Russia has launched a steady stream of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles against Ukraine since the early hours of the invasion on February 24, 2022 , but a shrinking missile stockpile has led to the attacks becoming less frequent, supplemented by Iranian-made kamikaze drones.

The war in Ukraine has also seen the use of two European cruise missiles, the U.K.’s Storm Shadow and the French SCALP missile . The two are essentially the same, with a 340-mile range and 990-pound warhead. The missiles donated to Ukraine are launched from specially modified Su-24 Soviet-era strike jets . Storm Shadow/SCALP was also used against the Khaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, ISIS in 2015, and by Saudi Arabia against Yemeni rebels in 2016.

The Russo-Ukrainian War has also confirmed an important, long suspected fact: low-flying, subsonic cruise missiles are vulnerable to man-portable surface-to-air missiles. In 2022, a Ukrainian National Guardsman was filmed shooting down a Russian cruise missile with an Igla surface-to-air missile. It was the first known case of a shoulder-fired missile, typically carried by infantry, shooting down a multi-million dollar cruise missile. How this event will affect future cruise missiles remains to be seen.

The Takeaway

Cruise missiles have dramatically changed warfare, as one might expect from a weapon that can fly 1,000 miles and deliver a half-ton high-explosive warhead within 32 feet of a target. The missiles allow countries that can afford them the ability to execute precision strikes on heavily defended targets without endangering pilots or aircraft.

The war in Ukraine will likely impart lessons on the next generation of cruise missiles , but the platform isn’t going anywhere anytime soon.

Kyle Mizokami is a writer on defense and security issues and has been at Popular Mechanics since 2015. If it involves explosions or projectiles, he's generally in favor of it. Kyle’s articles have appeared at The Daily Beast, U.S. Naval Institute News, The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, Combat Aircraft Monthly, VICE News , and others. He lives in San Francisco.

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U.S. Deploys Cruise Missile Submarine to Strengthen Deterrence Against Iran

Farzin Nadimi, a Senior Fellow with The Washington Institute, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region.

Amid rising tensions with Tehran and its proxies, the United States is sending a message by openly deploying one of its few guided missile submarines to the region.

Typically, U.S. submarine deployments are not announced in advance, especially when the vessels are entering a potentially hot zone of operation that may require them to rely on stealth, their main operational advantage. Yet conventionally armed guided missile submarines are an exception—their presence is occasionally made known as a show of deterrence. This seemed to be the main purpose when U.S. Naval Forces Central Command announced on April 8 that the USS Florida (SSGN-728) had been deployed to the Middle East “to help ensure regional maritime security and stability.” The Florida is one of only four guided missile/special forces submarines in U.S. Navy service—vessels that are usually tasked with top-priority clandestine missions.

Increased U.S.-Iran-Israel Clashes

On March 23, a U.S.-manned forward base near Hasaka, Syria, was attacked by an explosive drone launched by Iraqi Shia militias affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Among other casualties, an American contractor was killed in the attack—an outcome that crossed Washington’s red lines and triggered multiple U.S. airstrikes inside Syria. Yet those strikes were only partially successful in deterring Iran and its proxies—a salvo of rockets was soon fired at another U.S. compound in Syria, raising concerns about further escalation.

These clashes coincided with a series of Israeli standoff precision airstrikes against IRGC and Hezbollah targets in Syria beginning on March 30. The resultant deaths of two IRGC officers and other operatives prompted Tehran to issue promises of revenge. On April 2, a drone of reportedly Iranian origin tried to penetrate northern Israel from Syria but was shot down. The next day, Israel downed a Hamas Shahab drone as it tried to enter from the Gaza Strip.

Meanwhile, rising tensions in the West Bank led to multiple rocket strikes against Israel, some launched by Palestinian factions in south Lebanon and others from Gaza and Syria. In response, Israel conducted bombing raids targeting the launch sites. The risk of escalation is significant given ongoing tensions at the Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif and Iran’s declared “Qods (Jerusalem) Day,” which falls today, the last Friday of Ramadan. In this environment, the United States and its partners can benefit from the USS Florida’s deterrent effect and robust intelligence collection capabilities—and, if necessary, from its additional firepower.

Signaling with Submarines

According to media reports quoting U.S. defense officials, suspicious Iranian drone activities in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea spurred the U.S. Navy and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) to issue warnings of potential shipping attacks on April 5-6. The warnings were especially geared toward Israeli cargo ships and tankers, which were reportedly asked to navigate away from Iranian waters with their transponders turned off. Since February 2021, the IRGC has attacked Israeli-linked commercial vessels in the Gulf of Oman or Arabian Sea at least seven times, using suicide drones and/or limpet mines to damage the ships and, in one case, kill crewmembers.

It has been a while since the U.S. Navy acknowledged the deployment of a submarine to the region. On December 21, 2020, the USS Georgia —another SSGN, the designation used for nuclear-powered guided missile submarines— transited the Strait of Hormuz while surfacing alongside two U.S. missile cruisers. That deployment came during another period of high tensions marked by two developments: the imminent first anniversary of the U.S. strike that killed IRGC Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, and the November assassination of top Iranian nuclear official Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, allegedly by Israel. At the time, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group was also deployed to the northern Arabian Sea to support troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another high-profile deployment came on October 19, 2022, when U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Michael Kurilla was given a tour of the ballistic missile submarine USS West Virginia in the Arabian Sea. These vessels are considered key tools of strategic deterrence and part of the U.S. nuclear triad, and they do not often patrol in the Middle East. The move was interpreted as a message to Russian president Vladimir Putin (who had recently threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine) and Iran (which had been supplying Moscow with suicide drones for use in Ukraine, and possibly short-range ballistic missiles as well).

How Could an SSGN Be Used Against Iran?

The Navy’s four converted Ohio -class SSGNs are usually tasked with highly secretive intelligence gathering and conventional strike missions. They are armed with up to 154 vertically launched precision-guided TLAM-E Tomahawk cruise missiles (UGM-109E Block IV) with a range of up to 1,600 km and a 454 kg warhead. This version of the Tomahawk is capable of loitering in flight and has a two-way satellite datalink that can receive updated mission data for retargeting, course corrections, and damage assessment. This ability is especially useful for targeting air defense systems and mobile ballistic missile launchers.

The 1,600 km range could enable an SSGN submerged at a safe distance in the Arabian Sea to clandestinely launch cruise missiles at targets deep inside Iran, using any ingress point along its 784 km coastline with the Gulf of Oman and most of its 1,600 km land borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. This puts all of the regime’s military sites, military industrial facilities, and other targets in the south and east within striking range, as well as some of its main nuclear sites. Although the TLAM-E does not have significant hard-target penetration capabilities, its multi-effect programmable warhead still allows for some degree of “bunker busting,” especially when several missiles hit a single point sequentially.

With a vessel like the USS Florida in theater, Iran’s monitoring capabilities and cruise missile defenses along these vast and remote borders could be stretched quite thin (for a more detailed discussion of the regime’s air defense, including graphics, see PolicyWatch 3626 ). In January 2021, false reports of penetration by American cruise missiles from several directions reportedly caused confusion within Iran’s military command following its strike against al-Asad Air Base in Iraq—so much so that an IRGC TOR-M1 short-range air defense system shot down a Ukrainian civilian airliner near Tehran.

Converted Ohio -class submarines are also equipped with a thirty-ton dry deck shelter. This gives them the ability to deliver and recover SEAL commando teams on clandestine missions using submersibles or small boats.

These capabilities, coupled with robust intelligence gathering and task force command-level secure communications, give SSGNs carrier-like abilities when a carrier is not available. SSGNs also offer logistical advantages compared to a carrier strike group, such as quicker deployment and concealment of their whereabouts—though as noted above, the Pentagon will sometimes publicize a submarine deployment to achieve the same deterrent effects as a carrier presence.

In the current case, the Florida was apparently forward-deployed to the Middle East because the Russia-focused mission of the George H. W. Bush Carrier Strike Group in the East Mediterranean has been extended. Although the carrier group can still project airpower into Syria from the Mediterranean, cruise missiles launched by the Florida would offer a much better alternative against potential targets in both Iran and eastern/southern Syria, which could be struck from standoff range in the Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman. Low-flying Tomahawks are difficult to detect and counter, especially if launched from submerged SSGNs.

Interestingly, Tehran is eyeing a stealthy submarine launch capability of its own. Since at least 2019, the Iranian national navy has been developing and testing a canister-based system for launching Nasr antiship missiles from submarine torpedo tubes; these missiles now have a reported range of around 100 km. Iranian submarines still lack slant or vertical launch systems for long-range cruise missiles, but the regime is likely working on this capability.

Despite making overtures to American partners in the Gulf, Iran is still committed to pushing the United States out of the region and posing a clear and present danger to its forces in Syria and elsewhere. It has also been developing “anti-carrier” capabilities in the form of antiship homing ballistic missiles with a claimed range of up to 2,000 km.

In this environment, the U.S. Navy’s flexible and stealthy guided missile submarines are an excellent alternative to carrier deployments when needed, providing a way to enhance deterrence against Tehran and its proxies by maintaining a persistent clandestine presence—and delivering occasional public reminders of U.S. firepower. Notably, all four SSGNs are slated for retirement between 2026 and 2028, with no replacement in sight. Until then, however, the prospect of 154 Tomahawks causing massive damage inside Iran could send a powerful message, since the regime is obviously much more sensitive to potential strikes on its home territory versus far away in Syria.

Farzin Nadimi is an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, specializing in security and defense in Iran and the Gulf region.

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Everything you need to know about US Navy submarines

The silent service, “We come unseen.”

By Joshua Skovlund | Published Mar 20, 2024 10:23 AM EDT

• Military Life

The first recorded submarine attack in naval combat happened in 1776. An American submersible craft dubbed “Turtle” attempted to attach a time bomb to the British flagship called “Eagle,” which was a part of the Boston Harbor blockade. 

Though that early attempt failed, the desire to improve submersible technology led to today’s nuclear-powered submarines. The U.S. Navy just christened its latest Virginia class fast attack submarine, the USS Idaho, during a ceremony on Saturday, marking it as the 26th boat in its class to be christened . 

But, with recent budget cuts, the construction start date of the Navy’s latest class of submarines — the SSN(X) — is delayed until the early 2040s . With the replacement of the Virginia Class submarine being postponed for the third time, the current submarines will remain in active service. 

A brief history of submarines in warfare

Ever since the Turtle was used to try to breach the British blockade during the Revolutionary War, the U.S. Navy has continued to pursue submarine technology and its advancement. Submarines are a vital part of America’s defense, along with many other allied nations. 

The U.S. officially entered the underwater world of warfare after purchasing the USS Holland (SS-1) in 1900. It was commissioned on Oct. 12, 1900. John Holland designed the USS Holland, which was used for experimental purposes during its 10-year career.

When World War I kicked off, the threat of submarines existed, but it was not prevalent due to the early stages of developing submarine manufacturing and technology. At the time, the Navy had 11 different classes of submarines that used a combination of diesel-electric propulsion systems. 

The diesel-electric submarines were a step up from the previous steam-powered submarines, though the British Royal Navy’s K-class submarines used in WWI were steam-powered. Submarines played a minor part in WWI’s overall warfare.  

That was until World War II kicked off with the Nazis unleashing their feared U-boats. They implemented their submarines on merchant lane traffic and American ships. A Japanese submarine launched an attack on Fort Stevens, Oregon, in 1942 . The U.S. Navy moved to update its submarines to take on the lethal threat presented by the Axis powers. 

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They accomplished their goal as evidenced by the damage done to Japan by American submarines , which sank 540,192 tons of Japanese naval vessels and 4,779,902 tons of merchant shipping during the war — 54.6% of all Japanese vessel losses.

But after WWII ended, the Cold War quickly followed, creating an arms race with the constant threat of nuclear warfare that lasted from 1947 to 1991. That’s when the nuclear triad was established. It’s a military-force structure comprising unique air, land, and sea nuclear missile launch capabilities. 

That’s what the first-ever nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Nautilus IV (SSN-571), was built for. It was commissioned on Sept. 30, 1954, and went on to be the first submarine and crew to cross the North Pole underneath the Arctic polar ice pack. 

Since the Nautilus first hit the water, submarine advancements have enabled the Navy to launch personnel and various missiles and torpedos without ever coming to the surface.

Different types of submarines active in the Navy

The Navy has nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). 

Virginia, Los Angeles, and Seawolf Class submarines are all SSNs. Ohio and Columbia Class submarines are SSBNs. There is only one class of SSGNs, the Ohio Class. Each submarine class has a unique mission tailored to each boat’s capabilities. 

Attack submarines can hunt down and destroy enemy submarines and surface ships, as depicted in the 1990 blockbuster The Hunt for Red October . They can launch the Navy’s formidable Tomahawk cruise missiles or even special operations teams. 

Submarines have clandestine capabilities and missions, too. They can conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, support naval battle groups underway, and conduct mine warfare.

Attack submarines (SSN)

The SSN(X) is the future of attack submarines , meant to replace the Virginia Class with the most up-to-date technology. However, with the project delayed and no official date established, it will be a while before anyone sees it in action. 

The Navy has 22 commissioned Virginia class submarines, also known as SSN 774, with several more being built. These submarines have the latest upgrades, and their overall design allows easier updates on weapons systems, optics, etc. This helps them stay relevant instead of decommissioning the entire submarine when an update or new capability is introduced. 

Virginia-class submarines can transport several special operations personnel and their gear for extended operations. The crew has visible and infrared digital cameras on telescoping arms, enabling them to see in various environments and weather. The submarines can also operate in littoral and coastal areas of the ocean. 

Updates to the Virginia class submarine include a water-backed Large Aperture Bow, which provides enhanced passive detection capabilities. The 12 individual vertical launch system tubes are replaced with two 87-inch Virginia Payload Tubes. 

Each tube can launch six Tomahawk cruise missiles using Multiple All-up Round Canisters; this makes it more capable of different payloads due to the larger diameter tubes. 

The Virginia class is replacing the Los Angeles class submarine (SSN 688), though the Navy still refers to this class of fast-attack nuclear submarine as “the backbone of the submarine force.” 25 Los Angeles class submarines are currently in commission. Each one is armed with 12 Vertical Launch System tubes for firing Tomahawk cruise missiles. 

They have 25 torpedo tube-launched weapons, which allows Tomahawk missiles to be launched horizontally instead of vertically. But, as Virginia class submarines are commissioned, more Los Angeles class submarines are decommissioned. 

The last class of attack submarines is the Seawolf class, of which the Navy has three. This fast, quiet, and extensively armed submarine has some of the best sensors available. The Seawolf class has eight torpedo tubes and a maximum capacity of 50 weapons in its torpedo room. It’s larger, quieter, and faster than the Los Angeles class submarines. 

However, not all Seawolf class submarines are the same. The USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23), the third in its class, has a 100-foot hull extension. The Navy calls the addition the multi-mission platform, which allows the submarine to have “additional payloads to accommodate advanced technology used to carry out classified research and development and enhance warfighting capabilities.” 

Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

Nicknamed “boomers,” SSBNs are Ohio-class submarines designed as an undetectable launch platform for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. They are considered one of the stealthiest submarines capable of “precise delivery of nuclear warheads.”

There are 14 Ohio-class SSBNs , each carrying a maximum of 20 missiles, including the Trident II D5 missile, which has an increased range and accuracy compared to its predecessor, the Trident I C4 missile. SSBNs can go on extended deterrent patrols and have three large-diameter logistics hatches that allow speedy resupply, updates, and maintenance, which increases operational availability. 

According to the Navy, SSBNs spend an average of 77 days at sea, with a 35-day in-port for maintenance following each patrol. These submarines are a key component of the nuclear triad that acts as a deterrent to would-be enactors of nuclear conflict. 

The Columbia Class SSBN is the largest, most capable, and most advanced submarine in the fleet—but it’s not yet ready for deployment. The original target for the first commissioned Columbia Class submarine was FY2027, on par with the schedule of the US Strategic Command’s requirements. 

However, worker shortages and budget cuts have caused delays in building the first Columbia class SSBN, so there’s no definite date for the first commissioning ceremony. 

Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN)

The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review required 14 of the Navy’s 18 SSBNs to meet the nation’s strategic force needs. So, the Navy decided to transform four Ohio-Class SSBNs into conventional land attack and special operations forces platforms. This conversion of the four submarines was completed within five years. 

The USS Ohio (SSGN 726) was the first completed conversion in December 2005 and later deployed in 2007. The USS Florida (SSGN 728), USS Michigan (SSGN 727), and the USS Georgia (SSGN 729) were all mission-ready by 2007. 

All four SSGNs make up half of the Navy’s submarine fleet vertical launch payload capacity. Each SSGN can carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. They can carry up to 66 special operations personnel, and the missile tubes can carry stowage canisters for their equipment and food, allowing extended deployment.

The SSGN build has ample room for the added personnel, which also contributes to extended deployments. The forwardmost missile tubes are actually lock-out chambers that allow for clandestine infiltration and exfiltration of operators. 

These submarines serve a dual purpose of special operations and guided missile munitions — a lethal combination for any naval warfare scenario. 

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Joshua Skovlund is a staff writer for Task & Purpose and a former U.S. Army forward observer. He has been covering the military, veterans, and first responders for over three years, reporting on assignment from Ukraine during the opening salvo of the Russian invasion, multinational military exercises in Germany, and during the 2020 civil unrest in Minneapolis. His previous bylines include Coffee or Die Magazine and Outdoor Life .             Contact the author here.

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U.s. navy funds new submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile biden called ‘a bad idea’ (updated - acting navy secretary wants to defund).

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Budget documents reveal the U.S. Navy is developing a new nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, known as SLCM-N. President Biden described the missile as “ a bad idea ” when campaigning in 2019. Though an obvious candidate for cancelation, the SLCM-N program is going ahead.

The need for a new sea-launched cruise missile has been under consideration for some time, with the possibility mentioned in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review . An un-named Navy functionary told Defense News in February 2020 that it was on their wish list, but the publication of the new R&D budget makes it official: “Project 3467: This project will design, develop, produce and deploy a Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile.”

A submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missile with a conventional warhead. Carrying the nuclear ... [+] version would reduce the number of missiles available for conventional strikes

Conventionally armed BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles are the mainstay of the Navy’s arsenal for attacking land targets. With their long range and high precision, they are useful for taking on highly defended targets, and a salvo of cruise missiles will typically be fired to suppress defenses ahead of a strike by manned aircraft. On occasion, as in the 2018 strikes on Syria , they are used as a low-cost, low-risk alternative to airstrikes.

While not specified, the nuclear cruise missile would be a relatively low-yield weapon compared to the submarine-launched Trident ballistic missiles.

Both surface ships and submarines carry cruise missiles, and previous statements have been carefully ambiguous about which vessels would carry the nuclear version. However, one line in the new R&D budget submission mentions a requirement to “Assess the Virginia Class launch and control facilities to determine the extent of and evaluate for future upgrades.” This indicates that the nineteen nuclear-powered Virginia-class submarines will be launch platforms, in addition to any others selected.

The latest version of the submarine has the new Virginia Payload Module ; in addition to the basic 12 cruise missile launch tubes, the VPM caries and launches up to 28 additional cruise missiles.

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Existing conventional cruise missiles have a range of 800-1500 miles depending on the size of the warhead. The nuclear warhead – details yet to be determined – may be somewhat lighter than the conventional payloads, giving longer range. The navy did previously have a nuclear version, the original TLAM-N (“Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear) which was quietly retired some years ago . The SLCM-N is in a sense reinventing the wheel.

The 12 vertical-launch Tomahawk missile tubes of the USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723).

Putting nuclear cruise missile on Virginia-class would be a quick and easy way of ramping up strategic capability. Currently, the only nuclear-armed subs are the fourteen Ohio-class ballistic missile subs , so SLCM-N on Virginia-class would more than double that at a stroke.

But there are downsides.

“Putting nuclear-armed missiles back on the conventional surface or attack submarine fleets of the Navy is a real cause for concern,” says Monica Montgomery, a research analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “Doing so would erode the higher-priority conventional missions of the Navy by reducing the number of conventional missiles each boat could carry and increase the possibility of conflict escalation through miscalculation by blurring the line between conventional and nuclear cruise missiles on these vessels.”

Montgomery calls the message sent by the SLCM-N develpment “both surprising and troubling,” seeing it as potentially destabilizing, and says the Trump-era proposal should not have gone ahead under the new administration.

“The SLCM-N was truly low-hanging fruit ripe for cancellation in this year’s budget,” says Montgomery.

There is still time for the administration to change its mind in the next Nuclear Posture Review later this year, according to Kingston Reif , Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association

“Reversing the Trump administration's plan to pursue a nuclear SLCM should be an easy choice,” Reif says.

Reif describes the SLCM-N as “a costly hedge on a hedge” – an extra backup for an already extensive and growing nuclear arsenal – making it a pointless extravagance.

Reif also notes that the nuclear capability will come at the expense of urgently needed conventional weapons.

“Arming such vessels with nuclear cruise missiles would also reduce the number of conventional missiles each boat could carry, at a time when Pentagon leaders argue that strengthening conventional deterrence is their top priority in the Asia-Pacific,” says Reif.

Biden himself noted that fielding low-yield weapons as alternatives to more powerful ballistic missiles would make the U.S. “more inclined to use them” and increase the risk of a nuclear war.

The SLCM-N project is starting small, just $15.2 million in this year’s budget compared to the billions for other nuclear programs. But if the analysts are right, the U.S. Navy is buying trouble rather than new capability.

UPDATE : On June 8th, USNI News reported that acting U.S. Navy Secretary Thomas Harker directed the service to defund nuclear the SLCM-N in fiscal 2023, citing a leaked memo. It seems that there are people inside the Navy who question the value of a nuclear cruise missile too.

A memo of revised guidance indicated the SLCM-N will be cut

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French missile double punch adds new naval capability for Europe

PARIS — France’s synchronized test firing of naval cruise missiles from a surface ship and a submarine 400 kilometers apart adds a land-attack capability for European navies that may be more difficult for air defenses to counter, analysts told Defense News.

The French frigate Aquitaine and a Suffren-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, sailing near Quimper and Biscarosse, respectively, last week each fired a Missile de Croisière Naval or MdCN that simultaneously hit a target at a military testing site in south-west France, a first for the French Navy.

Coordinated cruise missile strikes could be used to saturate adversary defense systems, raising the chance of a successful hit on defended targets in a high-intensity context, the French Navy said in statement to Defense News. The synchronized double shot of the domestically developed MdCN relied on existing systems and software, the service said.

The French Navy’s coordinated launch from different platforms “is a notable development,” said Nick Childs, senior fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “Being able to carry out strikes from different platforms in different locations at the same time complicates the air-defense challenge for the opponent.”

Whether it’s possible to actually saturate air defenses depends on how many missiles can be launched and the sophistication of the defense, Childs said. He said both France and the U.K. already had the ability to carry out complex strikes through the combination of air-launched missiles and weapons from naval platforms.

The synchronized cruise-missile firing is “something special,” as few navies in Europe perform land strikes, said Sebastian Bruns, senior researcher at the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK). He said the exercise is “more of a capability demonstrator,” meant to validate the technology and telegraph the implications to would-be adversaries at the same time.

The political winds surrounding such military capabilities are changing, he added. “Land attack is entering the realm of the imaginable.”

The MdCN is France’s answer to the U.S.-made Tomahawk, and was developed by pan-European missile maker MBDA following a contract in 2006. The naval cruise missile entered service in 2017 and was used operationally by France for the first time in strikes against Syria in 2018.

“This development gives some operational advantage to the French Navy as a single service and more options for French planners,” Childs at the IISS said. “But it is probably not a game-changer in terms of capability.”

The French Navy said it regularly trains on multiple missile launches from different carriers, with trajectory coordination and synchronized missile arrival the most important training goals. Training on joint strikes is also planned with U.S. and U.K. partners, with regular exercises on coordinating trajectories and missile arrivals, according to the Navy.

Missile coordination is an active field of research, and a Google Scholar search for the term finds dozens of studies since 2023, including on neural networks for warhead coordination and ant-colony-based algorithms for missile-flight planning. Of the first 20 studies that show up, 16 are by authors affiliated with Chinese research institutes and companies.

While the U.S. can carry out this type of synchronized firing from different carriers, the U.K. only has this capability on its nuclear-powered attack submarines, according to the French Navy. The U.K.’s Trafalgar-class submarine Triumph fired Tomahawk missiles at Libyan air defenses during Operation Ellamy in 2011.

The U.K. Royal Navy aims to have similar options when its Type-26 frigates enter service with the ability to launch cruise missiles, Childs said. The Navy’s current Type-45 destroyers were originally intended to be fitted with land-attack cruise missiles, but that was never funded, he said.

The long-range capability provided by the MdCN “makes it possible to impose a military threat from the very outset of a crisis, thus influencing the will of competitors,” the French Armed Forces Ministry said in statement last week.

The French naval cruise missile is powered by Safran’s Microturbo TR 50 engine, and has a speed of around 1,000 kilometers per hour and a range of about 1,000 kilometers, according to official data . The 6.5-meter, 1.4-metric ton missile is launched using a first-stage booster that separates before wing deployment, and French submarines can launch the missile from their torpedo tubes in a protective shell that is discarded on breaking the surface.

Firing cruise missiles from a naval platform provides a permanent presence and “undeniable freedom of action” at sea, as there are no diplomatic overflight constraints, the Navy said. The use from a submarine also allows for actions that require greater discretion, it said.

The Netherlands has said it will equip its four current Zeven Provinciën-class frigates with Tomahawk missiles during maintenance in the 2025-2029 period, adding a land deep-strike capability the Dutch navy currently lacks. The Dutch also plan to fit the cruise missiles to their future air-defense frigates and submarines .

Sebastian Sprenger in Cologne, Germany, contributed to this report.

Rudy Ruitenberg is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. He started his career at Bloomberg News and has experience reporting on technology, commodity markets and politics.

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North Korea tests submarine-launched cruise missiles, KCNA says

• Oops! Something went wrong. Please try again later. More content below

By Jack Kim

SEOUL (Reuters) -North Korea tested its new submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) on Sunday, firing an upgraded missile for the second time in a week and accelerating its navy's nuclear armament, state media reported on Monday.

Leader Kim Jong Un supervised the test of the missile, called "Pulhwasal-3-31," which is identical to the strategic cruise missiles that the North test-launched last week as part of upgrading its weapons system.

State news agency KCNA and official Rodong Sinmun newspaper said the missiles flew above the sea off the country's east coast for 7,421 seconds and 7,445 seconds and hit an unspecified island target, indicating the flight time exceeded two hours.

Kim called the test a success, KCNA said, "which is of strategic significance in carrying out the plan...for modernizing the army which aims at building a powerful naval force."

South Korea's military said on Sunday that the North fired multiple cruise missiles off its coast but did not provide details. On Monday, it said the claimed flight time was an exaggeration saying it tracked the missiles real time and also played down the possibility it was propelled by solid fuel.

Last week, the North said it had tested a new strategic cruise missile, implying it was designed to carry a nuclear warhead, but at the time did not mention it was being developed for submarine launch.

State media photographs published on Monday showed a missile launching into a cloudy sky from the water trailed by a plume of smoke which obscures the type of platform it was being fired from.

North Korea's cruise missiles are typically less controversial and are not explicitly banned under U.N. Security Council resolutions. But analysts have said intermediate-range cruise missiles were no less a threat than ballistic missiles and are a serious capability for North Korea.

In recent months, the North has tested an array of weapons that include ballistic missile systems that are under development and an underwater drone.

Kim separately inspected the construction of a nuclear submarine and discussed issues related to the manufacturing of other types of new warships, KCNA said but gave no details.

North Korea last year launched what it called its first operational nuclear attack submarine, which analysts said appeared to be a modified from an existing submarine and likely designed to carry ballistic and cruise missiles.

There was scepticism over the real-world utility of such a vessel, especially compared to the more advanced land-based missile systems, because its diesel propulsion generates noise and is limited in range, according to weapons experts.

South Korea's military said on Monday it believed the submarine "has no military use" and the vessel appeared to be under repair or maintenance.

Kim said at the time the country would accelerate the programme to build nuclear-powered submarines.

(Reporting by Jack Kim;Editing by Andrew Cawthorne, Lisa Shumaker, Leslie Adler and Diane Craft)

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The Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile: Worth the Investment for Deterrence

Patty-Jane Geller

Former Senior Policy Analyst, Center for National Defense

Key Takeaways

The SLCM-N would provide a regionally present, sea-based, survivable option needed to fill a gap in U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities.

While air-based nuclear weapons remain a critical part of U.S. strategy, a sea-based regional nuclear missile can bolster these existing regional capabilities.

Because nuclear deterrence is both the Navy and DOD’s number one mission, resourcing the SLCM-N should take priority.

INTRODUCTION

As part of the United States’ effort to modernize its nuclear forces to confront the growing nuclear threat, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended restoring the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). The United States previously deployed a nuclear SLCM (or SLCM-N), called the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N) during the Cold War, but has since retired the capability. The NPR proposed the SLCM-N to adjust U.S. posture in response to Russia and China’s ongoing buildups of their regional, nonstrategic nuclear capabilities. The SLCM-N would provide a regionally present, sea-based, survivable option needed to fill a gap in U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities. It would also improve allied assurance of U.S. extended deterrence commitments and add stability to an imbalance of regional nuclear forces that exists in both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. Fielding the SLCM-N would require overcoming practical hurdles, including redeploying nuclear weapons on forward-deployed Navy ships, reallocating limited naval resources, and added costs. But ultimately, solving these challenges is feasible given the Navy’s previous experience deploying these weapon systems. Considering the immediacy of the nuclear threat and increased potential for limited nuclear use, investing in the SLCM-N is worth overcoming any practical difficulties

The SLCM-N is a theater-range cruise missile armed with a nuclear warhead that can be launched from surface ships or submarines. During the Cold War, the United States deployed the TLAM-N on surface ships and submarines from 1983 to 1991 as part of its strategy to deter a Soviet attack on Europe. In particular, the TLAM-N supported the strategy of deploying nonstrategic nuclear weapons to link conventional forces in Europe with the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. Because they were deployed in theater on submarines and surface ships, they helped assure allies that the United States’ extended nuclear umbrella would hold in the event of a Soviet attack. Additionally, the TLAM-N played an important role in deterring Soviet conventional or nuclear attack at a “middle rung” on the escalation ladder. While the United States deployed strategic systems to deter major strategic attacks and tactical systems such as nuclear artillery to deter conflict at the lowest rung of the escalation ladder, the TLAM-N helped fill this middle level, especially after the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty banned intermediate-range ground-launched missiles. Due to their survivability on stealthy attack submarines, the TLAM-N helped convince the Soviets that initiating conflict at this middle level of the escalation ladder would be met with an equivalent assured response.

After the Cold War ended, President George H.W. Bush withdrew the TLAM-N from service. It was kept in storage until 2010 when President Barack Obama’s NPR officially retired the capability. This decision was based on an assessment of the strategic environment at the time to be far more benign than the threats facing the United States today. But since then, the strategic environment has drastically shifted. While the United States dismantled its nonstrategic nuclear capabilities, Russia and China expanded them. Currently, Russia maintains at least 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons that are integrated into its doctrine of escalating conflict to compel its adversaries to back down. China is also advancing its theater-range missiles and rapidly growing its nuclear stockpile.

Rather than maintain the same nuclear posture meant for the previous strategic environment, the 2018 NPR recognized that U.S. posture must adapt to reflect the changed threat and proposed the development of two supplemental capabilities to increase the diversity and flexibility of U.S. nuclear forces. The first capability is a low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), the W76-2, which was deployed in early 2020. The second, long-term supplemental capability is to restore the SLCM-N within 10 years. The 2018 NPR required the Navy to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives for development of the SLCM-N. The AoA will answer questions on SLCM-N development and concept of operations, including the platforms on which SLCM-N will be deployed, the number of missiles to acquire, and whether the SLCM-N will utilize old TLAMs, technology from the LongRange Standoff Weapon program (LRSO), or new technology. To advance the discussion, this paper will assume that the SLCM-N can be deployed on attack submarines such as the Virginia-class and surface ships such as Zumwalt-class destroyers, as suggested by then commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) General John Hyten in 2018.

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For fiscal year (FY) 2022, Congress fulfilled President Joe Biden’s budget request of $5.2 million for the Navy to begin SLCM-N research and development efforts and $10 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration to begin work on an accompanying warhead, which will be an alteration of the W80-4 warhead currently being life-extended for the LRSO.7 The SLCM-N will likely take 7 to 10 years to deploy. While the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the SLCM-N might cost about $9 billion over 10 years, this assessment is very preliminary, and a more accurate cost will depend on the results of the AoA.9 The 2018 NPR called for reducing costs by taking advantage of existing technologies, so the extent to which SLCM-N utilizes technology from the LRSO currently under development or the Tomahawk missile has the potential to drive down costs.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The 2018 NPR proposed the SLCM-N to address the threat environment, which has changed dramatically over the past decade. The 2010 NPR claimed Russia to be no longer an adversary, and at that time there was still hope for China to rise peacefully. The 2010 NPR also established nuclear force modernization plans in line with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that the Department of Defense (DOD) is in the early stages of pursuing today. This current force structure reflects the more benign strategic environment of 2010, but Russia and China have significantly built up their nuclear forces since then. As STRATCOM commander Admiral Charles Richard recently noted , “For the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time, who must be deterred differently.” In addition, North Korea continues to improve its nuclear capabilities despite denuclearization efforts. Deterrence at a nonstrategic or regional level is becoming particularly challenging as Russia and China develop their nonstrategic nuclear capabilities while unconstrained by New START and North Korea bolsters its nuclear arsenal. While adversaries grow and advance their nuclear forces, U.S. nuclear posture remains static, as modernization plans consist of replacing existing systems on a one-to-one basis. Additionally, compared to adversaries’ nonstrategic arsenals, the United States only deploys a couple hundred B61 gravity bombs overseas that are not counted under New START.

To compensate for a perceived inferiority of conventional forces, Russia has sought to build a “deterrence ladder” that would enable it to employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons should the United States or NATO inflict unacceptable damage to its conventional forces. The 2018 NPR Russia maintains a diverse arsenal of delivery systems capable of carrying these nonstrategic weapons, ranging from short-range missiles to anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes, artillery, and potentially the defensive S-400 system.

China is also undertaking what Admiral Richard described as “a breathtaking expansion” of its nuclear forces. While China is completing a strategic nuclear triad accompanied by an assured second-strike capability, its advancement of regional nuclear forces means, as Richard noted , “they can do any plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally.” The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force deploys several road- and rail-mobile ballistic missiles with medium and intermediate ranges that can strike an array of targets across the Indo-Pacific with precision. Most missiles are dual-capable, and the DF-17 missile might be able to carry a nuclear-capable hypersonic weapon. Additionally, China’s H-6K bomber can carry nuclear weapons, and China’s sea-based capabilities will improve with the development of the JL-3 SLBMs. These forces enable the Chinese to backstop their conventional forces in the region. For instance, should China decide to forcefully take Taiwan, it can use its regional nuclear forces to coerce the United States and constrain U.S. response options.

North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities will also increase the challenge of deterring nuclear use at the regional level. Despite diplomatic efforts, the Kim regime continues to produce fissile material to build more nuclear weapons. It maintains an arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that can strike a range of targets in the Indo-Pacific. The presence of two nuclear-armed states increasingly hostile to the United States in the Indo-Pacific presents an increasingly complex strategic deterrence challenge to the United States.

THE CASE FOR THE NUCLEAR SLCM

The nuclear threat to the United States is unprecedented. Russia and China’s nuclear buildups indicate that they believe they can gain an advantage over the United States. So long as Russia and China continue to advance their regional nuclear forces and the United States simply maintains the same force posture designed for a different threat environment, this imbalance in regional nuclear forces will persist. As a result, the United States must take action to respond to this change in threat environment—doing nothing will jeopardize U.S. deterrence. The rest of this paper analyzes the 2018 NPR’s proposal to develop the SLCM-N in response to this change in threat, which the 2018 NPR states will provide a “needed nonstrategic regional presence” that will “strengthen the effectiveness of the sea-based nuclear deterrent force.”

What matters in determining a sufficient nuclear deterrent is the perceptions of adversaries of U.S. willingness to use nuclear force, not what the United States believes is necessary to deter. The argument for the SLCM-N is not necessarily that current U.S. forces are incapable of deterring Russian, Chinese, and North Korean regional nuclear threats, as it is impossible to know exactly why adversaries decide not to take certain actions. But because there is evidence that adversaries may believe they can gain an advantage by growing their nuclear forces or even employ their regional nuclear forces to compel the United States to back down in an ensuing conflict, more is needed to ensure certainty in the minds of adversaries that the United States can and will retaliate to even limited nuclear use. The SLCM-N has several unique attributes that would contribute to the credibility and flexibility of U.S. deterrence and allied assurance.

First, the SLCM-N can be deployed to the European or Indo-Pacific regions, increasing flexibility by providing the president with a proportional, credible response option. The SLCM-N will be deployed on sea-based platforms—likely destroyers or submarines—that can operate in theaters of conflict as opposed to U.S. strategic nuclear forces such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) located in the U.S. homeland or SLBMs deployed from nuclear ballistic missile submarines further out at sea. Russian and Chinese nonstrategic or regional nuclear buildups and strategies indicate that they may incorrectly perceive the United States to be reluctant to retaliate against a limited strike using a strategic nuclear weapon, which may disproportionally escalate the conflict further, and instead back down.24 While the United States may be confident in its ability to respond using strategic systems, what matters for deterrence is what adversaries perceive. Deploying a regional nuclear system that can more proportionally respond to limited nuclear employment can convince adversaries with more certainty of U.S. willingness and capability to respond to even a limited nuclear attack.

The need for a regional nuclear capability is especially acute in the Indo-Pacific theater, where the United States does not forward deploy any nuclear weapons. To respond to nuclear employment at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder in the Indo-Pacific, the United States would need to respond with a strategic nuclear weapon or relocate tactical weapons to the theater. While one cannot definitively say whether adversaries will view U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers as a credible deterrent against their tactical nuclear weapons, Russia and China’s massive regional nuclear force buildups indicate that they believe they can gain an advantage over the United States—an advantage that the United States must seek to limit. As the threat of regional nuclear forces grows, the SLCM-N can convince an adversary with more certainty that any nuclear use will be met with a proportionate U.S. response. The key is affecting threat perceptions in an enemy’s mind that the United States has viable options all along the escalation ladder that it can employ, not a quantitative matching of warheads.

Critics argue that the existing nuclear triad suffices to deter the growth in China and Russia’s nuclear capabilities, especially since the United States deployed the W76-2 low-yield SLBM in 2020. However, keeping U.S. force posture “as is” will allow this imbalance to persist in regional nuclear forces—which is profoundly destabilizing. The SLCM-N provides a unique capability to deter this growth in threat because it is nonstrategic, not limited to New START’s numeric caps, and can be forward deployed to directly deter adversary regional systems. The W76-2 provided a limited capability to have an option for a more proportional response to low-yield nuclear use in the short term, but more is needed to address the ongoing numeric growth in Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals. Since it is not treaty-constrained, the SLCM-N enables the United States to add more deployed nuclear systems in the longer term to ensure the United States maintains sufficient capacity to deter the growing threat. Additionally, while the W76-2 provides a useful option to respond with a low-yield weapon, a regionally present system may be a more appropriate response for many limited-use scenarios than a launch from a strategic SLBM.

Second, because the SLCM-N will be deployed on a sea-based platform, it adds a more survivable option to U.S. capabilities below the strategic nuclear threshold. Currently, the United States’ only systems that can be forward deployed are air-based. In Europe, the United States forward deploys a couple hundred B61 tactical nuclear gravity bombs that can be deployed on either U.S. fighters or NATO dual-capable aircraft. However, the storage locations of these bombs are known and therefore vulnerable to Russian attack. Without enough warning time during a crisis, Russia can destroy those bombs, leaving the United States without this option. In the Indo-Pacific, the United States does not forward deploy any nuclear weapons to counter the growing Chinese nuclear threat. The United States can send nuclear-capable bombers to both regions during a crisis, but doing so requires long flight times and avoiding advancing air defenses. In fact, advancing adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments indicates that adversaries may find U.S. air-based capabilities to lack credibility. According to a DOD report:

Given the major investment both Russia and China have made in A2/AD capabilities (especially advanced integrated air defense systems), each may come to believe it can effectively impede U.S. regional nuclear capabilities in executing their deterrence missions and thereby secure an exploitable coercive advantage. Dual-capable aircraft may be vulnerable, or perceived as vulnerable, to advanced defensive systems despite enhancements to their stealth and standoff features.

While air-based nuclear weapons remain a critical part of U.S. strategy, a sea-based regional nuclear missile can bolster these existing regional capabilities by more effectively operating against Russian and Chinese air defense systems. Sea-based, survivable submarines or even destroyers can operate in an extensive area and are difficult to find and destroy. Submarines are difficult to detect, and even Navy destroyers dispersed throughout the waters can make targeting difficult, especially if they have low observable characteristics, such as the Zumwalt-class. They can also operate in regional seas during both peacetime and crisis; they do not require long periods of time to deploy. As bombers, fighters, and their bases remain vulnerable to improving enemy A2/AD capabilities, the United States needs an additional regional nuclear option that is sea-based. The argument is not that the SLCM-N on sea-based platforms would be impervious to detection and attack compared to air-based nuclear forces, but rather that expanding options would improve the U.S. deterrence posture by making an adversary’s attack calculus more complicated.

Third, a SLCM-N’s cruise missile trajectory contributes to the U.S. ability to effectively hold targets at risk and complements ballistic missile options. For deterrence to be effective, the United States must ensure it can credibly hold targets at risk. Sea-launched cruise missiles fly at low altitudes, making them much more difficult to detect and intercept by adversary air defenses. The SLCM-N missile itself may incorporate advanced stealth capabilities if it is designed similarly to the LRSO. Ships can also launch multiple cruise missiles from multiple platforms simultaneously at independent targets, which complicates adversary air defenses and strengthens deterrence . This capability is similar to the ALCM, which also flies on a cruise missile trajectory, but is complementary, rather than redundant , especially considering adversary efforts to make airspace for bombers and fighters increasingly prohibitive. Additionally, unlike bombers that cannot remain in the same position for a long period of time without risk of being shot down, sea-based platforms can loiter close to targets. This attribute makes SLCMs particularly effective for striking time-sensitive targets. For instance, Russia, China, and North Korea all rely on the use of transporter erector launchers (TELs) to load and launch their mobile ballistic missiles. The SLCM-N can strike these targets promptly.

Therefore, the SLCM-N complements U.S. ballistic missiles—and the W76-2 low yield weapon in particular—by forcing the adversary to contend with missiles flying on both trajectories, in addition to missiles launched from both air and sea. This is not to argue that the United States cannot target time-sensitive targets such as TELs with other nuclear capabilities today or that a cruise missile would perform better than other capabilities. Rather, the SLCM-N increases the uncertainty and risk in adversaries’ behavior, as having to deal with both kinds of threats increases the demands on their advancing defense systems. Additionally, given the rapidly advancing threat and the time it takes to deploy new capabilities, commencing efforts now to increase the clarity in U.S. capability and will to respond is essential. Fielding the SLCM-N sends a strong signal that the United States will not tolerate regional aggression.

A regional, sea-based, cruise missile option would play an important role in both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters by convincing adversaries that attempts to escalate conflict will bring unacceptable risk. During the Cold War, the TLAM-N limited Soviet options for destroying U.S. forces deployed in Europe because even if the Soviets destroyed all the U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles, they could never be sure they could locate and destroy TLAM-Ns. In fact, the former commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral J. D. Williams, recalled Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev remarking in a meeting with U.S. president George H.W. Bush that: “We have read every one of your submarine messages for ten years and have been unable to find or kill even one of them. We quit.” Now, the United States does not even deploy nuclear missiles to Europe—only B61 bombs, of which Russia knows the locations. With more survivable SLCM-Ns lurking in regional waters, Russia would have to think twice before escalating conflict to the point where it believes it can employ nuclear weapons and win.

The SLCM-N may play a more critical role in the Indo-Pacific theater. The dual-capable nature of China’s theater-range ballistic missiles combined with its advancing early-warning and command and control capabilities indicate that its nuclear forces could backstop a strategy to take Taiwan and compel the United States to back down during a crisis. China’s growing regional nuclear forces can constrain U.S. response options if the United States cannot effectively deter nuclear use at the lower end of the escalation ladder. According to Admiral Richard , “We’ll be the ones that are getting deterred if I don’t have the capability to similarly deter them.” It is important to note that effective deterrence depends on the successful completion of the modernization of the entire U.S. nuclear enterprise—including warheads, delivery platforms, and command and control systems—but as a part of that effort, the deployment of SLCM-Ns would fill an important gap that exists today.

SLCM-N AND ALLIED ASSURANCE

Allies may question the credibility of a U.S. response to limited employment of nuclear weapons in Europe or the Indo-Pacific using its high-yield, strategic nuclear forces. They may also question U.S. assurance commitments in general should the United States ignore the growing disparity with Russia and China. A nuclear capability that can be deployed in allies’ own regions can help reinforce that the United States is committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella. Additionally, because it is sea-based, the SLCM-N can provide this benefit without the need for additional basing requirements. For this reason, NATO and Pacific allies would likely support the SLCM-N because it would improve deterrence of their aggressive neighbors without provoking domestic protests against nuclear weapons basing.

Maintaining allied confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella is critical as allies in Europe, and even more so the Indo-Pacific, become increasingly threatened by Russian and Chinese aggression. For instance, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson predicts that China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. At the same time, allies have reason to doubt U.S. commitments to extended deterrence, as the United States has sought to minimize its role in the world over the course of recent administrations. If the United States cannot modernize and maintain force levels of its own nuclear forces, allies will likely question the U.S. commitment to maintaining a nuclear force capable of deterring attacks against allies as well. Especially as allies such as Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities to produce their own nuclear weapons, the United States must ensure its extended deterrence commitment remains credible. Developing the SLCM-N would aid in this effort.

SLCM-N AND STABILITY

Critics of nuclear deterrence argue that the SLCM-N will negatively impact stability with U.S. adversaries or start an arms race. China and Russia’s nuclear buildups threaten strategic stability. Their expanding and diversifying arsenals may provide both nations options to escalate conflicts in novel ways to which the current U.S. nuclear posture would be challenged to respond. This trend erodes deterrence; China and Russia may be more willing to take risks or even strike first as the credibility and efficacy of a U.S. response diminish. Adding the SLCM-N to the U.S. arsenal is therefore stabilizing because it would begin to rectify this imbalance.

The SLCM-N would also not start an arms race. Both Russia and China are already expanding their nuclear forces, as well as developing new and novel nuclear systems. The SLCM-N is a modest response to these significant expansions—and would not be the cause of them. Senior military leaders have also consistently emphasized that the United States does not intend to match either nation system for system; however, doing nothing means ceding an advantage to adversaries and reducing the United States’ ability to deter nuclear use. Russia and China will of course seek to disparage the SLCM-N effort as destabilizing. Doing so is in their interest since the SLCM-N would help close in on the advantages they seek—not because it would disrupt any existing strategic stability that Russia and China have already been acting to squander.

Another concern is that because the United States also deploys conventionally armed cruise missiles, Russia or China will confuse a U.S. conventional cruise missile with a nuclear one and launch a nuclear attack in response. However, the logic that a state can characterize a warhead based on missile trajectory is fundamentally flawed when it is technically possible to put a nuclear payload on any type of delivery system. This problem is also not unique to the SLCM-N, as countries have deployed dual-capable weapons for years and this mistaken escalation has never occurred . In an escalating conventional conflict, a Russian or Chinese preemptive nuclear strike after a U.S. cruise missile launch is implausible. Because Russia and China have clear assured second-strike options available after a U.S. missile launch, preemptively launching nuclear weapons and risking nuclear retaliation when a chance exists that the U.S. missile launch was conventional would not be a rational response.

SLCM-N AND ARMS CONTROL

Developing the SLCM-N may also play a useful role in future arms control negotiations. The NPR states that the SLCM-N “may provide the necessary incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic nuclear weapons.” Russia has historically refused to even discuss its growing nonstrategic nuclear stockpile, much less negotiate on numbers and types. The Trump administration reached an agreement in principle for Russia to freeze all nuclear warhead growth in exchange for a short-term New START extension, but Russia reneged on that agreement after the U.S. 2020 election. Just as the U.S. deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe led to the INF Treaty in 1987, SLCM-N deployment—or even mere development—might compel Russia to the negotiating table. Deploying the SLCM-N may have a similar impact on China, which has thus far refused to participate in arms control discussions. Moreover, failing to respond to either nation’s nuclear buildups would likely decrease adversaries’ incentives for meaningful arms control by reinforcing their views that expanding their nuclear forces provides them a military advantage.

To be clear, the SLCM-N ought not be developed solely for the purpose of eventually being negotiated away. Given Russia and China’s regional nuclear force buildups, the United States should pursue the SLCM-N to help deter these threats. As General John Hyten testified when he was STRATCOM commander in 2018, “That [SLCM] capability is against the threat. However, that capability also gives our negotiators something to talk about. If you do not have something to talk about, it is very hard to sit down and negotiate. But it is not a bargaining chip because it is to counter the threat.”

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO ADDRESS

The case for the SLCM-N’s contribution to deterrence and national security is clear, as initially made by the 2018 NPR. The more important questions and concerns lie in the practical and feasibility implications of acquiring the SLCM-N. DOD will have to decide on which platforms it will deploy the SLCM-Ns, where any outcome would likely impact critical conventional naval missions. The Navy will also need to fit the SLCM-N into an already-constrained budget. While decisions such as platform, number of missiles, missile technology, and concept of operations have been examined in the AoA, this paper discusses potential options and outcomes to inform future policymaking. Ultimately, while developing the SLCM-N will require trade-offs, its development would provide a significant operational impact and is possible at a low cost.

The SLCM-N will likely be deployed on surface ships, attack submarines, or a combination of the two. In 2018, General Hyten specified that DOD would examine deploying SLCM-Ns on different types of submarines and the Zumwalt-class destroyer. While the Ohio-class, or future Columbia-class SSBNs, will likely not be an option, the Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) would be the likeliest candidate for submarine deployment. The U.S. Navy currently maintains 19 Virginia-class boats and will continue procuring about two more per year as the older Los Angeles-class SSNs retire. The Virginia-class has both vertical launch tubes and torpedo tubes that can carry the conventional TLAMs. Most Virginia-class boats being procured now and in subsequent years will carry the new Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an 84-foot-long section that can carry additional missile tubes, increasing capacity for missiles by about 76 percent. Given the Cold War experience of deploying SLCM-Ns, it is very plausible that new versions of this weapon could approximate the size of TLAMs and presumably fit in the VPMs or torpedo tubes of the Navy’s submarines.

As hinted by General Hyten, the Zumwalt-class destroyer (DDG-1000) could also deploy SLCM-Ns. The Navy owns three Zumwalt-class ships, with no plan for further procurement. The mission of the Zumwalt-class has recently expanded to include both surface warfare and land-attack capabilities. It carries the 80-cell Vertical Launch System capable of carrying TLAMs, making it a strong candidate for carrying SLCM-Ns. Surface ships can be seen and tracked, which would increase their vulnerability during conflict, but they can provide a powerful deterrence signal to U.S. adversaries. If deployed to the Indo-Pacific, announced in April 2021 that one of the Zumwalt-class ships would carry the Navy’s Common Hypersonic Glide Body, which would require missile tube alterations to fit the larger hypersonic missiles. Acquiring the hypersonic mission would not rule out the SLCM-N mission—if anything, carrying both systems would fit the Zumwalt’s new mission of blue-water strike. However, limited space on the Zumwalt-class may require trade-offs in the number of hypersonic versus nuclear cruise missiles it can hold. While this trade-off may be offset by future deployment of hypersonic missiles on the VPMs, policymakers will need to consider capacity limits.

Indeed, policymakers have already expressed concern with the SLCM-N detracting from core naval missions, “such as tracking enemy submarines, protecting United States carrier groups, and conducting conventional strikes on priority land targets,” according to introduced legislation . The Navy will also lose missile tubes when the Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) retire in the FY 2026 to FY 2028 timeframe. While the VPMs are intended to make up for lost space provided by the large SSGNs, the Navy’s total missile capacity will still decrease.

Deploying nuclear weapons on conventionally armed platforms brings several issues because DOD manages nuclear weapons differently than conventional weapons. Nuclear and conventional weapons use different fire control systems, requiring the Navy to add fire control stations to conventional ships that would deploy SLCM-Ns. Nuclear weapons management also requires separate personnel training and special security measures. Adding nuclear weapons to conventional ships is not as simple as inserting the missiles into tubes—doing so involves additional, hidden costs.

While these challenges are significant, the Navy can consider potential arrangements to find an amenable concept of operations, as it did during the Cold War. To avoid nuclear certification complications, the Navy could retrofit a block of submarines as dedicated SLCM-N carriers. But that could constrain those submarines from conducting their existing conventional missions. Instead, the Navy might retrofit a portion of its attack submarines to carry SLCM-Ns in addition to conventional weapons, allowing those boats to continue their conventional missions. During the Cold War, the deployment of TLAM-Ns on ships along with conventional missiles did not change the ships’ general mission to implement the Navy’s maritime strategy. One advantage of this option is that U.S. adversaries would not know which boats carried nuclear weapons, increasing uncertainty and deterrence. Indeed, much of the SLCM-N’s contribution to deterrence may be achieved with a relatively modest deployment, creating another opportunity to manage trade-offs.

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While delivery platform selection and nuclear certification processes may be complex and create additional costs, development of the missile itself may be simpler. Because the SLCM-N is not a new capability, the Navy can exploit existing technology and know-how to build the SLCM-N. As former secretary of defense James Mattis stated , “[B]y going back to a weapon that we had before, there is a fair amount of already sunk technology costs that we will not have to redo, will not have to come back up and ask for again.” The $9 billion cost estimated by the Congressional Budget Office is based on an assumption that the SLCM-N would be similar to the LRSO. However, the Navy has the option to simplify the SLCM-N development even further by just updating the TLAM-N. Even if the Navy does opt to build a brand-new missile, it could minimize costs by leveraging the technologies used to build the LRSO. In fact, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020 required that DOD report on opportunities to do just that.57 The decision to alter the W80-4 Life Extension Program (the warhead being developed for the LRSO) to fit the SLCM-N could also help minimize costs and simplify the effort. While deploying SLCM-Ns on ships may require additional burdens and costs, the Navy does not need to reinvent the wheel to develop the SLCM-N itself.

Ultimately, while issues with nuclear certification, personnel training, and resource allocation present valid challenges, they are not insurmountable and are worth resolving, considering the SLCM-N’s role in deterring the advancing global nuclear threat. Evidence is growing that nuclear war is likeliest to begin at the lower levels of the nuclear escalation ladder in either the European or Indo-Pacific theaters. Regional nuclear forces could also be used to coerce and constrain U.S. response options. This rising threat must serve as the prime driver for U.S. deterrence strategy. Because the SLCM-N can be deployed on a sea-based platform to the theater of conflict and provide a survivable cruise missile option, it can help convince both U.S. adversaries and allies of the United States’ will and capability to respond to a limited, regional nuclear strike. In this sense, it would increase stability among peers by helping to offset an imbalance between U.S. and adversary regional nuclear forces.

Practical considerations such as cost and resource allocation should not preclude the execution of this threat-driven strategy. While indeed challenging, concepts of operations for SLCM-N deployment exist that could lessen the burden on the Navy. The Navy has deployed SLCM-Ns before and can do so again. Even if future budgets remain constrained, the Navy can prioritize SLCM-N development at the lowest cost possible. Because nuclear deterrence is both the Navy and DOD’s number one mission, resourcing the SLCM-N should take priority. Ultimately, the United States must adjust its force posture in some way to respond to the change in nuclear threat, and the modest addition of the SLCM-N could have a significant impact on U.S. national security.

This piece originally appeared in On the Horizon

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Naval Group, TechnicAtome Test Nuclear Ignition of France’s Third Barracuda Submarine

Naval Group and TechnicAtome have conducted the first live test of the boiler room for the French Navy’s third Barracuda-class attack submarine, SNA Tourville (S637).

Developed in Cherbourg, the capability passed a stage called “divergence,” which validated its ignition while connected to the vessel’s core nuclear reactor.

Ahead of its firing, the boiler room received authorization from the French government’s defense nuclear and radiation protection authority to ensure its safety during trials and employment.

Paris wrote that the test will be followed by the Tourville’s primary sea trials in the summer to prepare for its delivery.

“The first divergence of a reactor nuclear power is undoubtedly one of the most emotional times for our teams,” TechnicAtome CEO Loïc Rocard stated .

“I salute the quality of their work and their commitment to the success of this program started in 2006.”

“I am also delighted at the excellent collaboration we have with our partner Naval Group to carry out our mission to serve from France.”

SNA Tourville

France ordered the Tourville in 2011 to complete a six-vessel fleet to replace the nation’s aging Rubis-class submarines, in service since the 1980s. Naval Group began constructing the Tourville two years later in Cherbourg.

For the boiler room project, the company is in charge of the main components and integration tasks, while TechnicAtome focuses on the design and construction of the facility.

The simultaneous development is being supported by French Alternative Energies and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Upon completion, the Tourville is expected to enter service between 2024 and 2025.

The three remaining Barracuda vessels, the Grasse, Rubis, and Casabianca, are now in different phases of development and are set to be handed over through 2030.

“The start of the nuclear boiler room on board the Tourville is a major event for the Barracuda program and demonstrates the excellence of the French nuclear industrial sector,” Naval Group CEO Pierre Éric Pommellet remarked.

“This event is also an opportunity to recall that French industrial facilities are fully committed to service the French Navy and the sovereignty of France in terms of naval nuclear propulsion.

The Barracuda-Class Submarine

The French Navy’s Barracuda-class submarine is 99.5 meters (326 feet) long and has a beam of 8.8 meters (28 feet).

It has a speed of 25 knots (46 kilometers/29 miles per hour) underwater and can reach depths up to 350 meters (1,150 feet).

With unlimited range, the vessel’s endurance depends on crew fatigue and supply capacity. It is operated by 12 sailors and has the capacity for over 40 personnel.

A Barracuda platform is equipped with various sensors for mine, combat management, navigation, and electronic countermeasures.

It is armed with land-attack cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, heavyweight torpedoes, and multi-purpose mines.

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All you need to know about Pakistan’s Hangor class submarines

Pakistan’s latest hangor class is a direct rival of india’s kalavari class of diesel-electric attack submarines. here is what you need to know, and how the two compare..

The first Hangor class submarine, built by China for Pakistan, was launched on April 26 at a Wuhan shipyard. This was the first of eight submarines of this class that the Pakistan Navy is set to induct into its fleet by 2028. Here is all you need to know.

Basic characteristics

The Hangor-class, an export variant of the Chinese Type 039A Yuan class, is a diesel-electric attack submarine, named after the now decommissioned PNS Hangor, which famously sank Indian frigate INS Khukri during the 1971 war.

“Diesel-electric” refers to the mode of propulsion — diesel engines power the submarine when surfaced or snorkelling (as they need air to operate), while a battery, charged by the diesel engine, allows the vessel to operate while submerged. The Hangor-class boasts four diesel engines. It is also equipped with an air independent propulsion (AIP) system, which significantly increases the submarines’ endurance underwater.

Attack submarines are specifically designed for sinking other submarines or surface vessels using torpedoes, or in modern times, cruise missiles. The Hangor-class has six 21 inch torpedo tubes, and capabilities to launch anti-ship missiles, as well as the Babur-3 subsonic cruise missile, which has a range of 450 km.

Comparison with India’s Kalavari class

Pakistan’s Hangor class is the direct counterpart of India’s Kalavari class of submarines, based on the French Scorpene-class. India currently operates six Kalavari class submarines, with three more set to be inducted into service by the early 2030s.

In terms of size, the Hangor class is significantly bigger than the Kalavari class, which displaces 1,775 tons and is 67.5 m long. The Hangor class, on the other hand, has a displacement of 2,800 tons, is 76 m in length, 8.4 m in width (at its widest point), and has a draught (depth of the vessel below the waterline) of 6.2 m when on the surface.

While this probably means that the crew of the Pakistani submarines would lead (slightly) more comfortable lives, in shallow, littoral waters, this is a major drawback, with Kalavari class being much more manoeuvrable. The Pakistani submarine has a reported top speed of 20 knots (37 kmph), same as its independent counterpart.

The Kalavari class, like the Hangor class, runs on diesel-electric propulsion. However, the models India currently operates do not come with built-in AIP. This means that in terms of underwater endurance, the Hangor class potentially has an edge on the Kalavari class.

This matters because submarines’ USP is their ability to be stealthy — much of which comes from their capability of remaining underwater for extended periods of time. Conventional diesel-electric submarines need to surface to recharge their batteries after a few days (2-5, depending on the battery used), making them detectable to enemy radar and exhaust fumes sensors. An AIP system can increase submarines’ underwater endurance manifold (upwards of 15-20 days). The Indian Navy is currently in the process of installing an indigenously developed AIP system to its Kalavari class submarines.

In terms of armament, the Kalavari class carries six 21 inch, German-made torpedoes, and missile systems such as French Exocet anti-ship missiles, and MICA anti-air missiles. This is likely superior, and more battle tested than Hangor’s armament. Both submarines do not have vertical launch systems (like the ones in India’s nuclear Arihant class), which would allow it to carry bigger cruise missiles like the Brahmos-NG.

Both submarine classes carry state of the art sensor suites, although details of Hangor’s capabilities in this regard are not out in public.

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French Naval Mastery: Coordinated Missile Strikes Herald New Era of Maritime Power

Posted: April 29, 2024 | Last updated: April 29, 2024

In a striking demonstration of advanced military capability, the French Navy recently achieved a significant milestone in maritime warfare.

Last week, the French frigate Aquitaine and a Suffren-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, while operating 400 kilometers apart, near Quimper and Biscarosse respectively, successfully conducted a simultaneous land-attack on a target using the domestically developed MdCN (Missile de Croisière Naval).

This event marks the first time that coordinated cruise missile strikes from both a surface ship and a submarine have hit the same target, suggesting a new chapter in naval strategy and an increase in European naval power projection.

This synchronized assault is more than just a technical achievement; it illustrates a complex strategy that could potentially overwhelm adversary defenses in a high-intensity conflict. The French Navy's statement to Defense News pointed out that coordinating missile strikes from different platforms significantly raises the chance of a successful hit on defended targets.

Expert analysis from Nick Childs, senior fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, underscores the tactical implications: "Being able to carry out strikes from different platforms in different locations at the same time complicates the air-defense challenge for the opponent."

However, the true potential to saturate air defenses relies on the number of missiles that can be launched and the sophistication of the defense systems they are targeting.

This operational leap forward reflects a broader trend in European military thinking. Sebastian Bruns, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK), remarked that the exercise demonstrates a "capability demonstrator" that both validates the technology and serves as a signal to adversaries that land attack from the sea is entering the scope of the possible for European navies.

The MdCN, France's homegrown response to the U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missile, produced by pan-European missile manufacturer MBDA, became operational in 2017 and saw its first use in French military action against Syria in 2018.

With a range of about 1,000 kilometers and a speed of approximately 1,000 kilometers per hour, the MdCN provides the French Navy with a long-range striking option that Childs believes gives France operational advantages and more strategic options, even if it may not be a complete game-changer.

The practical implications of this technology are significant. The French Armed Forces Ministry highlighted that the MdCN's range allows for the imposition of a military threat from the onset of a crisis, influencing the will of competitors. The use of this missile from submarines is particularly noteworthy for its discretion, adding a layer of stealth to French naval power.

Notably, the French Navy is not alone in seeking to enhance its strike capabilities. The U.K. Royal Navy is also preparing to incorporate similar capabilities with its Type-26 frigates anticipated to launch cruise missiles. This comes after the U.K.'s Trafalgar-class submarine Triumph employed Tomahawk missiles during Operation Ellamy in Libya in 2011.

Additionally, there are plans for the Netherlands to arm its four Zeven Provinciën-class frigates and future air-defense frigates and submarines with Tomahawk missiles during maintenance periods between 2025 and 2029, which will endow the Dutch navy with a capability it currently lacks.

The realm of missile coordination is an active field of research, indicating the global strategic importance of these systems. A Google Scholar search reveals numerous studies from 2023 onward, including sophisticated algorithms for missile-flight planning, a substantial portion of which are from Chinese research institutes and companies.

France’s successful demonstration goes beyond a show of technological prowess; it reflects an evolving geopolitical landscape where naval power and the ability to project force from the sea are increasingly critical components of national security.

As the global order shifts and new threats emerge, this dual launch event serves as a harbinger of the enhanced naval capabilities that will define the future of maritime strategy and international power dynamics.

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AUKUS Submarines Will Cost up to $63 Billion Over Next 10 Years

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Submarines with conventional armaments and nuclear-powered engines—and the associated infrastructure—will receive $53 billion to $63 billion (US$34 billion to US$41 billion) over the next decade, the Australian government says.

The infrastructure is primarily a nuclear-powered submarine operating base in Western Australia.

Australia’s long-range naval capability is a particular focus of the National Defence Strategy.

Announcing the latest strategy last week, Defence Minister Richard Marles said it was about “projecting” as opposed to merely defending, the country. It also pivoted from a strategy of deterrence to one of denial.

Deterrence relies on the threat of reprisal to discourage an opponent from pursuing a certain course of action; denial works by putting the opponent’s objective out of reach, regardless of whether they choose to pursue it. During a conflict, a denial strategy might involve destroying an opponent’s key military assets.

An additional $51 billion to $69 billion will fund maritime capabilities for sea denial. Additionally, a need for more “localised sea control operations” means the Navy’s surface combatant fleet will expand, including 36 MH‑60R Romeo helicopters, costing $2.4 billion to $2.7 billion, which support additional major vessels.

These have both anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capabilities and are equipped with torpedoes, air-to-ground missiles and rockets, and crew-operated guns.

The Navy’s long-range strike capabilities will be enhanced by acquiring the Tomahawk weapon system from the United States.

Sea Sparrow Missiles

These missiles are multi-purpose medium-range, surface-to-air interceptors . They’re designed to counter high-speed anti-ship cruise missiles, low-velocity air threats like drones and helicopters, and high-speed manoeuvrable surface threats such as small boats.

Autonomous lethal vehicles also receive a substantial investment, of between $5.2 billion and $7.2 billion. Defence says these will be “dedicated to subsea warfare capabilities” and that some may be obtained through AUKUS Pillar II Advanced Capabilities.

Pillar II is the non-nuclear component of the AUKUS pact, primarily involving sharing the latest technology, including defence and space.

They’re described as “large and extra‑large uncrewed and autonomous underwater vehicles” which would be used to “undertake stealth missions in high‑risk environments.”

The Navy will also add to its fleet of Bluebottle remotely piloted unmanned surface vessels, which are manufactured by Australia-based marine technology provider Ocius Technology and used for persistent maritime surveillance.

The company has been making these for the Navy since it won the 2015 Capability and Technology Demonstrator programme contract to develop an unmanned surface vessel with autonomous anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.

Between $4 billion and $5 billion will be spent on upgrading and sustaining the current fleet of six Collins-class submarines, which underpin the transition to the new AUKUS submarines.

Additional funding for maritime capabilities includes about $12 billion to $15 billion for sea-based strike, $2 billion to $3 billion for elements of the electronic warfare capabilities, and $810 million to $910 million for maritime command systems.

These investments will allow the Navy to hold targets at risk for longer ranges, providing greater capacity to target adversary aircraft and missiles.

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